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1 CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
Today’s vehicles have hundreds of microcontroller based Electronic Control 
Units (ECUs) such as Engine Control Unit, Transmission Control Unit, Antilock Brake 
System, Adaptive Cruise Control Unit, Air-bag Control Unit and so on. Moreover, the 
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) has taken initiatives to use wireless 
communication technologies such as Vehicle-to-Roadside (V2R), Vehicle-to-Vehicle 
(V2V) and Vehicle-to-Person (V2P) communications to improve road safety, 
transportation efficiency, traveling comfort, and provide ubiquitous wireless connectivity 
to the Internet. Various mobile commerce services such as navigation information, 
emergency roadside assistance, location-based services, deliverance of digital 
information such as e-mail, entertainment, diagnostics and prognostics, pay for insurance 
can be incorporated in future vehicles [1]. Integration of these new features will require 
future vehicles to host more ECUs, communication devices and other hardware and 
software modules. The software of these ECUs needs to be updated from time to time for 
a variety of reasons such as to add new applications, add/upgrade new functionalities in 
existing system, tune performance parameters, eliminate software bugs, avoid recalls and 
keep the vehicle compatible with the ITS infrastructure. Thus, software update in 
vehicles’ ECUs will become a routine task for the manufacturers in near future. 
Present software update technique in vehicles’ ECUs is a unicast process and it is 
done physically, e.g., software is uploaded on an individual basis in service station. 
  
2  
Instead of updating in service station if the software could be updated remotely using 
wireless communication links, it would be beneficial to both users and auto 
manufacturers in terms of time, labor and money. In this technique, an ECU will receive 
the software from a remote software distribution center using the road side Base Station 
(BS) as a gateway between the vehicle and the remote download server. However, as 
with any other wireless applications, security is a crucial issue in remote software updates 
using wireless link. Transmitting software packets over radio channels makes 
eavesdropping, data altering, theft of service, and denial of service (DoS) attacks easier 
for adversaries. The basic security requirements, i.e., integrity and confidentiality of the 
transmitted software and authenticity of both the software sender and receiver must be 
guaranteed in order to avoid any future disasters due to malfunctions of the vehicle or to 
protect the proprietary algorithms from hackers, competitors or people with malicious 
intent. Since security protocols in WLAN and WWAN has security flaws [2, 3], 
additional security mechanism is needed for RSU. This thesis presents a secure 
architecture for RSU in a vehicle’s ECU where the software provider can establish a 
point-to-point secure communication link with the vehicle via the roadside BS under 
which the vehicle resides and sends the necessary software to the non-functioning ECU.  
The above software upload technique is useful if a particular vehicle experiences 
some problems with its functionality. However, if an Auto Company or ITS authority 
decides to add new features or update an existing features or needs to eliminate software 
bug from a large number of vehicles, multicasting the software packets will be more 
efficient than multiple unicast transmission. Multicasting is the bandwidth conserving 
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technology that accepts a single message from an application and delivers copies of the 
message to a subset of hosts as a group transmission [4]. As with unicast, multicast 
communication requires security services such as access control, data confidentiality, 
traffic confidentiality, integrity, data authentication, source authentication, sender and 
receiver non-repudiation and service assurance. In this thesis, an infrastructure based 
secure wireless multicasting architecture is presented for RSU in future vehicles’ 
electronic modules. In general, the security requirements are achieved by employing 
modern cryptographic techniques using a session key (SK) shared by all legitimate group 
members. The design of an efficient key management technique i.e., generation, 
distribution and updating the SK is the critical part for the realization of secure multicast. 
Since distribution and re-keying of SK incur extra burden in communication network, 
key management technique seeks to minimize this computation and communication 
burden by efficient key distribution as well as providing security requirements. Hence, 
one of the objectives of this research is to determine an efficient and reliable key 
management protocol for Vehicular Software Distribution Network (VSDN). The VSDN 
is considered as wireless network where vehicles are connected to the software 
distributors through roadside BSs. In order to make the system scalable the large VSDN 
is partitioned into small subgroups based on region and the Regional Group Manager 
(RGM) will be responsible for distributing the software within its region. The Software 
Vendor (SV) named as Central Manager (CM), RGMs, BSs and vehicles form 
hierarchical structure where the CM sends the software packets to RGMs and the RGM 
transmits the packets to BSs within that region and finally, the BSs multicasts these to 
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authorized vehicles. This hierarchical architecture benefits from its decentralized nature 
of Group Key Management (GKM) [5].  Although the BSs are not interested in multicast 
data, they can take active part in key management to reduce the workload on multicast 
Group Manager (GM). This requires some level of trust on the BSs [6]. On the other 
hand, one of the security requirements of an efficient GKM protocol is to put trust on 
minimal number of entities to increase the security level [7]. In this research, two 
different scenarios are considered. In one scenario the BSs are considered as fully-trusted 
and in other case they are considered as semi-trusted entities. Consequently, two GKM 
protocols are proposed and a comparative performance analysis of these two protocols is 
presented in terms of computation overhead, communication overhead and storage 
overhead required by each entity involved in key management. Finally, how the overhead 
on GM and vehicles can be traded-off with the level of trust on BSs is discussed. 
1.2 Contribution 
The contribution of the thesis can be summarized below: 
1. This work presents a mechanism for RSU in a vehicle’s ECUs when that 
particular vehicle encounters some problem with its functionality. In this 
mechanism, the AC or SV sends software to the vehicle via roadside BS. The 
BS authenticates the vehicle using vehicle’s authentication key which is pre-
loaded to the vehicle and establishes secure point-to-point wireless 
communication link before sending the software to the vehicle. In order to 
increase the security level, it is recommended to send multiple copies of the 
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software. Through analytical and simulation results it is shown that it is 
sufficient to send two copies of software to the vehicle.  
2.  In order to upload software to a large number of vehicles at a time, this work 
also proposes a secure wireless multicast protocol that employs BSs as gateways 
between vehicle and software provider. 
3. Consequently, two GKM protocols for secure multicast are proposed based on 
the trust level on BSs. Both protocols provide mutual authentication, non-
repudiation and secure transfer of multicast SK to the group members. 
4. The performance of the proposed GKM protocols is compared in terms of 
communication, computation and storage overhead. Analytical model is 
developed to obtain the communication delay while transmitting messages 
through wired and wireless channel. The models are used to find various latency 
such as multicast session initialization latency, handoff latency etc.  
5. Extensive simulation is conducted to validate the analytical results of multicast 
session initialization and find the feasibility of the proposed models. 
In future, vehicles will be equipped with wireless devices to communicate with 
each other as well as with various service providers. The AC can use wireless link to 
update software to various ECUs remotely. This research will provide solution on how 
the software packets could be distributed efficiently, securely and cost effectively. 
1.3 Outline 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: 
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Chapter 1 – This chapter provides an overview of the research work that will be done 
throughout the dissertation. It describes the motivation behind this work and defines the 
research objectives.      
Chapter 2 – This chapter presents background information about the technology used in 
this work. It also gives a brief review of existing security protocols used in wireless 
communication and past research done on multicast key management. Each technology 
and past work is discussed with a concise expository of its technique and performance 
evaluation if it is available.  
Chapter 3 – This chapter describes the secure unicast software upload technique and its 
analytical modeling for different scenarios with regard to vehicle’s buffer size and 
software packet verification methods. 
Chapter 4 – This chapter aims to describe the proposed multicast architecture to upload 
software in future vehicles’ electronic modules using wireless technology. It explains the 
detail key management technique used for secure multicast. It also develops analytical 
model of the whole system to find the end-to-end delay on establishing the secure group 
communication and to find the handoff latency during on-going multicast session.  
Chapter 5 – This chapter summarizes the results of performance analysis of both the 
unicast RSU technique and multicast RSU technique and provides discussions on the 
results.  
Chapter 6 – This chapter concludes the thesis. 
  
7  
2 CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
This chapter gives a brief overview of basic technology used in this thesis, current 
security protocols exist in wireless communication technology, various GKM protocols 
proposed in past and the past research done on RSU.  
2.1 MAC Protocol for IEEE 802.3 
The IEEE has developed the 802.3 standard families for local and metropolitan 
area networks. The 802.3 MAC protocol employs 1-persistent Carrier Sense Multiple 
Access protocol with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) [8]. The operation of 1-persistent 
CSMA/CD transmitter and receiver are shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, respectively. 
If the channel is sensed idle, it transmits the packet with probability 1. If the channel is 
sensed busy, it waits until the channel goes idle and transmits the packet. With the 
collision detection feature, a station can “listen while transmit”. With this feature all the 
data frame transmission involved in a collision will be aborted immediately after the 
collision is detected, thus reduces the duration of a collision period. The collided stations 
broadcast jam signal to make the collision more obvious. The retransmissions of the 
unsuccessful transmissions are scheduled at some time later in future. In case of collision, 
the truncated Binary Exponential Backoff (BEB) [9] retransmission algorithm is used to 
resolve the collision. 
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Figure 2.1 1-persistent CSMA/CD Transmitter. 
2.1.1 Delay Analysis of 1-persistent CSMA/CD 
Several throughput and delay analysis for 1-persistant CSMA/CD are available in 
literature [10-13]. In this work, the analysis of 1-persistent CSMA/CD protocol 
performed by Iida et. al. [12] and Tobagi et. al. [10] and BEB retransmission algorithm is 
used to find the average message transmission delay for wired part of the  
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network.  
Figure 2.2 1-persistent CSMA/CD Receiver. 
According to [12], a transmission cycle of a channel consists of a busy period (B) 
and an idle period (I). Let U denotes the useful period in a cycle where the channel 
carries useful information. Using renewal theory the average channel utilization, 
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In a busy period there could be three different types of transmission period (TP) 
depending on success and collision: 
aT += 1)1(  
baYT ++= 2)2(         (2.2)  
     
baT += 2)3(  
where T is the packet transmission time, 
T
a
τ
= is the normalized propagation delay ; 
T
J
b = is the normalized jamming signal and Y is the time interval between the beginning 
of TP and the generation time of the first colliding packet within the vulnerable period a . 
The cumulative distribution function of Y is: 
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aGGy
Y
e
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−
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−
−
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1
)(         (2.3) 
where G is the offered load i.e., the average number of packets (both new and 
retransmitted ) generated per packet duration time. 
Let, )( jP i is the probability that iTP , the i
th
 TP, is equal to )( jT and ir , the 
probability that there is no transmission queue at the end of iTP . The expected values 
of B ,U , and I can be calculated as: 
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where kρ is the probability that a busy period (BP) consists of k TPs. The average 
collision time is given by, 
aG
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e
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G
ba
baYTC
−
−
−
−++=
++==
1
1
2
2)2(
       (2.5) 
Unlike other access method, 1-persistent CSMA channel incurs an additional pre-
transmission delay, W , if upon its arrival, the packet detects the channel busy. The 
average waiting time when the channel is sensed busy is given by 
Z
Z
2
2
where Z is the 
random variable representing the time B′ during a cycle that the channel is in its busy 
period excluding the first a seconds. The average value of Z is given by 
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Then the average waiting time, W is given by 
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The average number of retransmission for successful transmission is given by [10] 
1−=
S
G
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For BEB algorithm, the average backoff time for n
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 retransmission [14], 
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where bt is the 1-unit of backoff time, m is the maximum backoff window size.  
The probability of collision at n
th
 retransmission [14] 
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Hence, average backoff time for rN number of retransmissions, 
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Let R be the average delay between two consecutive transmissions (i.e., a retransmission) 
of a given packet. For 1-persistent CSMA/CD,  
WtCR backoff ++=         (2.12) 
Finally, the expected packet delay is 
WaR
S
G
tD +++−= 1)1(        (2.13) 
2.2 MAC Protocol for IEEE 802.11 
The IEEE 802.11 working group has decided the CSMA with Collision 
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) as MAC protocol for wireless LANs using BEB algorithm for 
medium access during collision [15]. The fundamental technique is called Distributed 
Coordination Function (DCF). The DCF defines two access mechanisms: the basic access 
and the Request-to-Send/Clear-to-Send (RTS/CTS) mechanisms. In  
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Figure 2.3 Example of Basic Access Mechanism. 
this thesis, basic access mechanism is assumed since the GKM messages are short. An 
example of data transmission using basic access method is shown in Figure 2.3. In the 
basic access method, a station with a packet to transmit senses the medium. The station 
transmits if the medium is idle. If the medium is sensed busy, it continues to monitor the 
medium until it becomes idle for more than Distributed Inter-Frame Space (DIFS) time 
period. The station then initializes the backoff timer and defers transmission for a 
randomly selected backoff interval in order to minimize the collision. The backoff timer 
is decremented when the medium is idle, is frozen when the medium is sensed busy and 
resumes only after the medium has been idle for longer than DIFS. The station, whose 
backoff timer expires first, begins transmission and the other stations freeze their timers 
and defer transmission. Once the current station completes transmission, the backoff 
process repeats again and the remaining stations re-activate their backoff timer. A station 
that receives a data packet, replies with a positive acknowledgement (ACK) packet after a 
SIFS time interval, confirming the successful reception of the packet. If the sender does 
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not receive an ACK within specified time, the packet is assumed to be lost and reschedule 
according to the backoff rules. In addition, a station must wait a random backoff time 
between two consecutive packet transmissions to avoid collision. After a successful 
packet transmission, if the station has packets buffered for transmission, it starts a new 
backoff process. 
2.2.1 Delay Analysis of CSMA/CA 
Researchers have used two-dimensional Markov chain model of its backoff 
window size to compute throughput and average transmission delay of IEEE 802.11 
MAC protocol [16-18]. Following the same reasoning with [16-18], the probability τ that 
a station transmits a packet in a randomly chosen slot time is given by  

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where W is the initial window size,  m is the station retry limit, m′  is the number of 
backoff stages and p is the probability of an unsuccessful (re)transmission seen by a 
station while transmitting a packet through the channel. The unsuccessful 
(re)transmission can happen due to: collision with at least one of the )1( −n remaining 
stations, occurring with probability cp  , or packet error due to fading and/or noise. Let 
fp is the probability of packet error due to fading/noise. Then the pseudo collision 
probability p can be expressed as: 
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Figure 2.4 Generalized state transition diagram of transmission process based on   
Markov Chain of backoff window size. 
 
Equations (2.14) and (2.15) represent a non-linear system with two unknowns τ  and 
p which can be solved numerically. 
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Figure 2.5 Time for successful packet transmission and collision of Basic Access   
Method. 
In [19], the Markov Chain model of the exponential backoff process and the 
signal transfer function of generalized state transition diagram is used to find the 
probability distribution of MAC layer service time. As mentioned earlier, the backoff 
timer will be decremented by one for every idle slot detected, will be suspended and 
deferred a time period of sucT  or colT  when the medium is detected as busy due to a 
successful transmission or a collision, respectively. The signal transfer function, )(ZH d  
of the decrement process of backoff timer is given by [19], 
)]()()(1[
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ZCPpZSP
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ZH
tsuctsuc
d −−−
−
=
σ
     (2.16) 
where σ is the duration of an empty slot, )(ZS t  and )(ZCt are probability generating 
function (PGF) of sucT and colT , respectively and sucP is the probability that there is one 
successful transmission among other stations in the considered time slot given that the 
current station does not transmit. For basic access method, sucT and colT  is (Figure 2.5) 
δ2+++++= DIFSACKSIFStHT psuc      
δ+++= DIFStHT pcol        (2.17) 
where, H is the MAC and PHY header, pt  is the packet transmission time and δ  is the 
propagation delay. Assuming fixed packet size, the PGF of sucT  and colT is given by 
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Let DT is the time elapsed from the start state (i.e., beginning to be served) and end state 
(i.e., being transmitted successfully or discarded after maximum times retransmission 
failures) of a packet transmission process. According to [19], the PGF )(ZB of DT is 
given by,  
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The )(ZB  can be expanded in power series as: 
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Hence, the arbitrary thn  moment of DT can be obtained from the 
thn differentiation 
of )(ZB . For example, the mean and second moment of DT is given by: 
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2.3 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Method 
The Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange is a well-known cryptographic protocol 
that allows two users to jointly establish a shared secret over an insecure communication 
channel without any prior secrets [20]. The protocol uses two system parameters: p is a 
prime number and g (usually called generator) is an integer less than p which is capable 
of generating every element from 1 to 1−p when multiplied by itself a certain number of 
times, modulo the prime p . The algorithm is described below. 
Suppose Alice and Bob want to agree on a shared secret key using D-H key 
agreement protocol. 
1. Alice generates a random private value a , computes public value 
pg a mod and sends it to Bob. 
2. Bob generates a random private value b  , computes public value 
pg b mod and sends it to Alice. 
3. Alice computes ppgk abab mod)mod(= and Bob computes 
ppgk baba mod)mod(= . 
4. Now both Alice and Bob have the shared key baab kkk ==   
The protocol depends on the discrete logarithm problem for its security. It assumes that it 
is computationally infeasible to calculate the shared secret key k given the two public 
values pg a mod  and pg b mod when the prime p is sufficiently large. 
Since the protocol does not provide authentication of the communicating parties, 
the D-H key exchange is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack. A person in the middle 
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may establish two distinct D-H key exchanges, one with Alice and one with Bob, 
effectively masquerading  Alice to Bob and vice versa. In 1992, the authenticated D-H 
key agreement protocol was developed to overcome the man-in-the-middle attack [21]. 
The security is achieved by allowing two parties to authenticate themselves to each other 
by using public-key certificate and digital signatures. It assumes that the two parties Alice 
and Bob possess a public/private key pair and a certificate for the public key. Both Alice 
and Bob sends their signature and public-key certificate along with their public values  
pg a mod  and pg b mod , respectively. Even the attacker can intercepts messages 
between Alice and Bob, she cannot forge signatures without their private keys. 
2.4 WLAN Security for 802.11 
Although wireless technologies offer the users with additional conveniences over 
the wired technologies, they also introduce unique security challenges. Various threats 
and vulnerabilities associated with wireless network and hand held devices are listed in [2, 
3]. Broadcasting messages over radio channels makes eavesdropping, data altering, theft 
of service, and denial of service (DoS) attacks easier for adversaries. Hence, additional 
mechanisms are needed to protect the communication over wireless network. Brief 
descriptions of current security protocols used in WWAN (3G cellular) and WLAN 
(802.11) are shown below. Since WPAN allows very short distance communication, it is 
not suitable for remote software upload. Hence, security of WPAN is not discussed here. 
2.4.1 WTLS, KSSL, WEP, WPA and 802.11i, 802.16 
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) 
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  Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) is the security layer of Wireless 
Application Protocol (WAP). The WAP is developed by WAP forum [22] to enable small, 
low-power mobile devices such as PDAs, cell phones to access Internet over the low 
bandwidth wireless networks. Due to protocol incompatibilities, WAP uses 
Internet
Web Server running 
SSL/TLS
WAP Proxy/Gateway
Wireless 
Device
WTLS
SSL/
TLS
WAP Gap
 
Figure 2.6 WTLS: A Proxy Based Protocol. 
proxy-based technology to connect wireless domain to Internet as shown in Figure 2.6. 
The WAP proxy server or gateway translates requests from WAP protocol to Internet 
Protocol (takes place between Web server and WAP proxy/Gateway) and translates WAP 
content into compact encoded format to send over low-bandwidth wireless network 
(takes place between wireless client and WAP proxy/Gateway) [23, 24]. The WAP 
required two security protocols: WTLS from wireless client to the WAP Gateway and 
SSL/TLS from the WAP Gateway to a web server on the Internet as shown in Figure 2.6. 
During the protocol translation from WTLS to TLS, WTLS encrypts the communication 
between the client and gateway, decrypts and re-encrypts using SSL/TLS, leaves data 
temporarily unencrypted in WAP Gateway. This so called “WAP gap” problem and 
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many other security problems identified in [25, 26] demanded additional improvement of 
WAP protocol. The WAP 2.0 includes a version of TLS in WAP device stack so that 
WAP Gateway no longer needs to translate WTLS protocol into TLS protocol, thus 
provides better end-to-end security [24].  
Kilobyte SSL (KSSL) 
Although SSL/TLS is the most widely used security protocol for secure 
transaction over the wired Internet, it was assumed to be inadequate for resource-
constrained devices. Vipal Gupta and Sumit Gupta from Sun Microsystems investigated 
the performance of SSL on mobile devices and found that SSL is also suitable for 
wireless devices [27]. They developed Kilobyte SSL (KSSL) which is a small-footprint, 
client-side-only implementation of SSL 3.0 for hand held and wireless devices, supports 
RSA_RC4_128_MD5 and RSA_RC4_40_MD5 cipher suites, provides server 
authentication via RSA signatures as well as arbitrary certificate chain lengths and uses 
“abbreviated SSL handshake” SSL architecture. The result was corroborated by [28] 
where the feasibility of using strong cryptographic protocols such as SSL, S/MIME and 
IPSec on mobile devices was investigated. The increase of processing power and memory, 
and the feasibility of using SSL/TLS in hand-held devices has motivated researchers to 
design SSL/TLS based Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) for future mobile 
networks [29, 30]. 
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)  
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the first protocol which attempted to provide 
security in IEEE 802.11 standards  [15]. WEP provides encrypted communication 
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between a wireless access point (AP) and a client. The communicating parties share a 40-
bit (or 104-bit) secret key k which is used to encrypt the transmitting data. The protocol is 
described briefly in Figure 2.7.  
Message  M
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Check Value 
(ICV) 
CRC
Initialization 
Vector (IV) v
Secret Key k RC4
Keystream 
RC4(v, k)
XOR Ciphertext C
Plaintext P
PRNG
M ICV
 
Figure 2.7 WEP Protocol. 
IEEE 802.11b defines other mechanisms to limit the access to an AP or a set of APs: 
SSID (Service Set Identifier) and MAC (Media Access Control) Address Filtering. Each 
AP is programmed with an SSID which corresponds to a specified wireless network [24]. 
A wireless station willing to access that particular AP, must be configured with the 
appropriate SSID and must present the correct SSID to access the AP. In MAC Address 
Filtering technique, each AP is configured with a list of MAC addresses associated with 
the client computers allowed to access the AP. A client is allowed to access the AP only 
if it’s MAC address is enlisted and the SSID presented by the client is the AP’s SSID.  
Unfortunately, in the last few years the researchers have proved that the WEP is 
failed to provide three main security goals, i.e., confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication, due to its various design flaws and poor implementations [31, 32]. Some 
of them are listed below:  
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• 40-bit shared key is too small for brute-force attack [32]. Even though WEP 
allows 104-bit key, it is impossible to avoid reuse of keystream because of small 
Initialization Vector (IV) size (24-bit) and the static shared key. The XOR 
operation of two ciphertext using same IV eliminates the keystream and results in 
the XOR of two plaintexts. If one of the plaintexts is known, the other can be 
obtained. A dictionary can then be created that specifies the keystream used for 
each IV. In this way, an attacker can eventually decrypt all transmissions without 
ever knowing the secret key.       
• The inherent weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of RC4 [33], allow an 
adversary to discover the key by eavesdropping several millions packets [34]. 
• The Integrity Check Value (ICV), used to provide message integrity, is obtained 
from CRC checksum operation. CRC is not a cryptographic function, rather it is 
an error detection function used in communication. Moreover, ICV is a linear and 
un-keyed function of message [32]. Hence, the integrity of message is not 
guaranteed. The weak integrity also causes easier plaintext recovery, IP re-
direction, reaction attack etc. [32]. 
• Since IV reuse is allowed, message injection is possible if the attacker knows the 
plaintext/ciphertext pair. The keystream can be derived as Plaintext XOR 
Ciphertext and any plaintext can be encrypted using the keystream [32]. 
• Similarly, an adversary can easily spoof the Shared Authentication by 
eavesdropping authentication process of legitimate clients, i.e., by observing 
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plaintext challenge sent by the AP and encrypted response sent by the client [31, 
32].  
• The 802.11 standard does not specify the key management of the shared secret 
key, i.e., how to distribute the keys among the legitimate users [32]. Moreover, 
use of same key by many users makes it difficult to replace the compromised key 
materials [15]. 
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) 
The severe security flaws discovered in WEP have led the Wi-Fi Alliance to come 
up with strong, interoperable security replacement for WEP which is known as Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) [35]. WAP adopts Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) to 
provide strong data encryption which still use RC4 algorithm, but includes a per-packet 
key mixing function, a Message Integrity Check (MIC) named Michael, an extended IV 
with sequencing rules and re-keying mechanism [35]. WPA provides Pre-Shared-Key 
(PSK) authentication for home or office environment to authenticate the peers whereas it 
uses IEEE 802.1X authentication [36] with an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 
[37]  in enterprise environment to provide stronger authentication. Although WPA was 
proposed to address all known vulnerabilities of WEP, there are still some weaknesses 
due to the limitation of using previously designed hardware. The IEEE Standard Board 
has approved 802.11i on June 24, 2004, which incorporates more comprehensive solution 
for WLAN security [38]. 802.11i defines Robust Security Network Association (RSNA) 
for mutual authentication and key management, enhanced encryption technique called 
Counter-mode/CBC-MAC (cipher block chaining (CBC) with message authentication 
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code (MAC)) to provide strong authentication, confidentiality, integrity and replay 
protection. The Wi-Fi Alliance has adopted the 802.11 security standard in their 2
nd
 
version of WPA known as WPA2, which was designed to meet 802.11i security criteria. 
The security analysis of 802.11i shows that it provides satisfactory authentication, data 
confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection [39]. However, several vulnerabilities 
such as Man-in-the-Middle attack, Security Level Rollback attack etc. might arise due to 
poor implementation of RSNA  [39]. Moreover, the DoS vulnerabilities are not taken 
care of in 802.11i. Hence, it is necessary to deploy security mechanisms to defend against 
DoS attack to make 802.11i more robust against security threats. 
2.5 Multicasting 
Multicasting is the ability of a communication network to accept a single message 
from an application and to deliver copies of the message to multiple selected recipients at 
different locations [40]. It is a more efficient technique for group communication as it 
provides transmission and routing of packets to multiple destinations at a lower network 
and host overhead than broadcasting to all hosts or unicasting to each host in a group. 
Unicast (one receiver) and Broadcast (all receivers) are two special cases of the Multicast 
method. Figure 2.8 illustrates the difference between unicast, broadcast and multicast. 
Multicasting is implemented efficiently on broadcast LAN such as Ethernet. Example of 
such multicast is Internet Protocol (IP) multicasting.   
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Figure 2.8 A) Unicast Transmission B) Broadcast  Transmission C) Multicast 
Transmission.  
 
Although multicast has been very successful at providing an efficient, best-effort 
data delivery service to large groups, it has proven much more difficulties to extend other 
features, such as security, in a scalable manner. As compared to unicast, multicast is 
susceptible to more attacks due to its unique properties. For example, since multicast 
allows open group membership and open access to send packets to the group [41], it 
possibly cause eavesdropping, theft of service, or denial-of-service. The precise set of 
security requirements for group communication is determined by the application using 
C) 
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the service. However, a minimal set of requirements can be given that most applications 
share such as: 
2.5.1 Source Authentication 
Member identification and authentication is essential to prevent an intruder from 
impersonating a legitimate group member or group manager. In unicast communication, 
authentication can be achieved in symmetric mechanism: the sender and the receiver 
share a secret key to compute a message authentication code (MAC) of communication 
data. After verifying the MAC the receiver is confirmed that the sender generated the 
message. However, in multicast communication symmetric MAC authentication is not 
secure, because every receiver knows the MAC key and could impersonate the sender 
and forge messages to the other receivers. Multicast authentication scheme should 
uniquely identify the source of each generated message. Some applications requires 
signature to provide non-repudiation. The addition of digital signature (DS) to each 
message satisfies both source authentication and non-repudiation.  
2.5.2 Access Control 
After a party has been identified, access control should be performed in order to 
validate group members before giving them access to group communication data such as 
group key. Traditional method is to provide decryption keys to the authorized members 
only. However, there are still risks involved with unauthorized users receiving encrypted 
data such as traffic analysis or cryptanalysis. Moreover, it is vulnerable to Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack in which malicious member joins a number of multicast groups, 
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utilizing large amounts of bandwidth or router resources. Hence, multicast receiver 
access control is required to control the ability of hosts to join the multicast group.  
2.5.3 Data Integrity 
Data integrity ensures that the data is not modified or deleted in any unauthorized 
way. In both unicast and multicast communication, integrity could be achieved through 
authentication. Authentication ensures that the data originates from the claimed source 
and the data was not modified during transport.  
2.5.4 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality ensures that the multicast data could be read only by the group 
members. The typical solution is to encrypt the data with a secret key which is known 
only by the sender and the legitimate receivers. Distributing a secret key efficiently to a 
large number of receivers is a challenge. This becomes more complicated when the group 
membership is dynamic. In most applications, it is necessary to change the group key so 
that a new member cannot access the old data (known as backward secrecy) and a leaving 
member cannot access the new broadcast (known as forward secrecy). Moreover, 
maintaining Group Key secrecy, i.e., ensuring that no outsider can find any group key is 
also important. The design of an efficient and viable Group Key Management technique 
is the critical issue for the realization of a secure multicast communication.  
2.5.5 Watermarking 
Encryption is generally used to safeguard content while it is being transmitted so 
that unauthorized persons cannot read the confidential data. However, this does not offer 
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any protection against unauthorized duplication and propagation by the intended receiver 
after she receives the data. Watermarking can provide protection in the form of theft 
deterrence.  It embeds some identification information into the content in such a way that 
it cannot be removed by the user but can be read by the right party. 
2.6 Multicast over Wireless Network 
Multicast over wireless network is defined as the ability to send data to a set of 
mobile units, communicating to each other for a particular operation, regardless of the 
mobility of the units [42]. The recent advances in wireless communication technology, 
wireless devices and mobile workforce, demand for multicast communication over 
wireless networks. Applications of wireless multicast include group-oriented mobile 
commerce, military command and control, distance education, intelligent transportation 
system, mobile auction etc. In military environments, tactical information may be multicast 
to users, tanks, and planes; distance education and entertainment services can be offered to 
mobile or remote users; intelligent transportation systems involve the dynamic routing or 
rerouting of individual vehicles; current traffic information, as well as the most direct and 
least time-consuming routes, can be multicast to drivers; in the future, commercial aircraft 
may fly on the most efficient routes guided, in part, by multicasts of location information 
concerning other nearby aircraft, objects, and destinations [42]. Since the access points of 
mobile units change over time, it poses several challenges for efficient multicast routing 
in mobile users [42]. Multicast communication over wireless networks can be divided 
into two classes: Multicast routing for infrastructure based wireless network and 
multicast routing for Ad Hoc wireless network [42]. Software distribution in intelligent 
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vehicle is an example of infrastructure based wireless network, whereas inter-vehicle 
communication for collision avoidance system is an example of Ad hoc network. 
Infrastructure-based wireless multicast network involves base stations and switches in a 
fixed topology and mobile users. Existing multicast protocols such as Distance Vector 
Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP), Multicast Extension to Open Shortest Path First 
(MOSPF), Core-based Tree (CBT), and Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM), can be 
modified for wireless multicast [42].  
2.7 Multicast Group Communication Confidentiality and Group Key 
Management Properties and Proposed Solutions 
To ensure confidentiality during multicast session, the sender (source) shares a 
secret symmetric key with all legitimate group members, named as “Traffic Encryption 
Key (TEK)” or group “Session Key (SK)”. The sender encrypts a multicast message with 
the TEK using a symmetric encryption algorithm whereas upon receiving the encrypted 
message{ }TEKm , each valid receiver that knows the TEK can decrypt it with the TEK and 
retrieves the message. In order to ensure backward secrecy, forward secrecy or protection 
against any kind of cryptanalysis, the Group Controller (GC) must generate a new TEK 
and securely distribute it to the group members. This procedure is known as “re-keying”. 
The distribution, use and update of keys involved in encryption and re-keying is generally 
known as “Group Key Management (GKM)”. 
  
31  
 
Figure 2.9 Group Key Management Requirements. 
 
Figure 2.9 summarizes the requirements of efficient GKM protocols from four points of 
view [5, 7]: 
Security Requirements 
• Forward Confidentiality: Users who left the group should not have access to any 
future key so that they cannot decrypt data after they leaves the group. 
• Backward Confidentiality: A new user that joins the session should not have access 
to any old key so that it cannot decrypt data sent before it joins the group. 
• Collusion Freedom: Any set of fraudulent users should not be able to deduce the 
current TEK. 
• Key   Independence: The disclosure of a key does not compromise other keys. 
• Minimal Trust: The GKM protocol should not put trust on a high number of entities. 
Quality of Service (QoS) Requirements 
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• Low Bandwidth Overhead: Both the initial keying and re-keying of the group should 
not incur high number of messages to be exchanged between GC and the group 
members. 
• 1-affects-n: A single membership change in the group should not affect all the other 
group members. 
• Minimal Delays: The re-keying messages must be delivered in timely manner so that 
members receive the message before new key takes effect. 
• Reliability:  Re-keying messages must be delivered reliably to prevent loss of 
messages. 
• Service Availability: The failure of a single entity must not stop the whole multicast 
session. 
Other Requirements 
• Low Storage: The number of keys that the GC and members need to keep should be 
low. 
• Low Computation: Computation required by the GC and members to process keying 
messages should be minimal. 
Many secure and scalable key management techniques have been proposed which can 
be divided into three main categories depending on different features, requirements and 
goals [5, 7]:  
I. Centralized GKM protocols: A single key server known as Key Distribution 
Center (KDC) is responsible for computing and distributing group key to all 
group members. 
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II. Decentralized GKM protocols: The management of a large group is divided 
among subgroup managers, thus minimizing the workload in a single place.  
III. Distributed GKM protocols: There is no explicit KDC, and all the members 
contribute to generate group key. 
2.8 Related Works 
Several efforts have been taken by the industry and the researchers to create a 
standard for the ECU interface and communication protocols for RSU. In [43], a generic 
RSU technique is proposed where one of the ECUs with more processing power and 
wireless Internet connection capability named as Head Unit (HU) acts as a gateway to 
receive software from remote maintenance server and distribute it to the targeted ECU 
via Controller Area Network (CAN). Mutual authentication between the HU and the 
remote administrative server is assumed to be done using standard security protocols used 
in WLAN or WWAN. Since all the existing security protocols used in WWLAN and 
WWAN has some security flaws as stated in Section 2.4, both symmetric and 
asymmetric/public-key cryptographic techniques and the combination of two (symmetric 
and asymmetric) have been proposed for secure software download in mobile devices 
[44]. In symmetric approach, both the SV and mobile terminal share a secret key. The SV 
uses this key to create a MAC value of the software (e.g., keyed hash function) and send 
it along with the software. The mobile terminal verifies the authenticity of the SV by 
checking the MAC and the integrity of the software by comparing the hash value of the 
received software and the one contained in the MAC. Since both parties share the same 
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secret key, anyone who has the key could generate the MAC, thus it does not guarantee 
non-repudiation in case of dispute between SV and mobile terminal [44]. Moreover, the 
secret key must be transmitting to both the parties through secure channel before 
establishing the software distribution session. Since symmetric-key cryptography is 
involved in encrypting and decrypting the software, it requires less processing. In public-
key approach, it is assumed that a supporting Public-Key-Infrastructure (PKI) exists 
where trusted parties provide certificates to mobile terminals as well as the SV.  The SV 
generates a license of the software, which contains the information about integrity of the 
software (cryptographic hash of software), validity date, issuer identity, recipient’s 
identity etc., and digitally signs it. It sends the software and the signed license encrypted 
with the mobile terminal’s public-key. Mobile terminal decrypts the software using its 
private key and verifies signature using SV’s public-key. This technique provides non-
repudiation; however, it suffers from high computational cost. Hence, combination of 
both symmetric and asymmetric techniques, i.e., exchanging a per session secret-key 
using asymmetric technique and encrypting/decrypting software using symmetric 
cryptographic technique, provides us with non-repudiation as well as fast 
encryption/decryption operations. For mutual authentication, authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key exchange method [45] can be used to generate a symmetric session key 
where SV and the mobile terminal possess each other’s authentic public key. In VSDN, 
we assume that vehicles are connected to the software supplier through BS or Intelligent 
Transportation Tower (ITT). The BS/ITT will receive software from the AC or SV and 
transmit it to the particular vehicle. Since vehicles are highly mobile device, the 
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authentication process between vehicle and BS/ITT should be fast. Hence, in our 
architecture we use symmetric cryptographic technique for mutual authentication 
between vehicle and BS/ITT. In order to prevent the known-key attack, different 
authentication key is used for different software upload session. Moreover, in order to 
increase the security level, we propose the vehicle to upload two copies of the software 
and the message digest (MD) in each copy. An MD algorithm takes signed message as an 
input and produces a hash which allows to verify the integrity and authenticity of the 
message. Since the vehicle will not accept the software unless the packets in two copies 
match, there is no chance that the vehicle will upload the software that is changed by the 
hacker. 
Several GKM protocols for secure multicasting have been proposed in literature 
mostly for fixed networks [5, 7]. Among these schemes, those that employ tree-hierarchy 
for the arrangement of keying materials are well-accepted for its communication 
efficiency. The basic tree-based protocol, known as Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH), has 
communication complexity )(log2 nO for re-keying, group member storage complexity is 
)(log2 nO and GM storage complexity is )(nO when applied to members of n [7]. 
Recently, cluster-based approaches are adopted for scalable GKM where the key 
management domain is divided into smaller administratively scoped areas or clusters and 
the key management role is distributed to each area/cluster head. The area could be 
logically or physically characterized. Among the proposed protocols, the most popular 
one is Ious where each cluster head generates the encryption key for the cluster [46]. The 
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cluster head locally controls the re-keying during group membership change, thus keep 
the other subgroups unaffected and reduce the workload of GM. 
Recent advancements in wireless communication technology, wireless devices 
and mobile workforce, demand for multicast communication over wireless networks. 
Some applications of wireless multicast are: group-oriented mobile commerce such as 
mobile auctions, military command and control such as dissemination of tactical 
information to troops, various ITS applications such as distribution of weather 
information, optimum route information, traffic information to drivers, software 
distribution to vehicles’ ECUs,  inter-vehicle communication for collision avoidance, 
including mobile users in multicast sessions such as distance education, audio and video 
conferencing, news distribution, on-demand stock information, pay-per-view game, 
movie etc. However, host mobility in mobile multicasting introduces additional 
complexity in GKM. In infrastructure-based wireless mobile multicasting, cluster based 
decentralized GKM protocols are well-suited where the key management domain is 
divided into smaller areas/cluster based on the coverage area of a single BS or a group of 
BSs. The BSs work as cluster heads and may take part in key management depending on 
the trust model of the system [6]. Following the similar concept, in this thesis we propose 
two GKM techniques for the multicast group formed for RSU in vehicle ECUs named as 
FT and ST systems. In the FT system, the BSs have access to software packets and they 
take part in key management; whereas, in the ST system the BSs act as proxies for the 
vehicles by honestly relaying the encrypted software packets from the software 
distribution centers to the vehicles. We describe multicast session establishment methods 
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for these two GKM protocols that comprise authentication of the software distributor and 
vehicles, establishment of secure link, and generation and distribution of SK to them. 
Consequently, we developed an analytical and simulation model based on realistic 
vehicle distribution and movement, wireless channel access mechanism and message 
reception mechanism to evaluate the performance of these two protocols by finding the 
multicast session initialization latency and handoff latency. We present numerous 
analytical and simulation results collected for various distribution of system parameters.  
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3 CHAPTER 3 – SECURE UNICASTING FOR RSU IN A 
VEHICLE’S ECU 
3.1 The Proposed Architecture for Secure Software Upload 
In the proposed architecture, we assume that the Auto Company (AC) might have 
its own software distribution center or it has agreement with a third party Software 
Vendor (SV) to provide the required software. Each vehicle is equipped with several 
ECUs such as Communication ECU, Crypto ECU, and GPS ECU etc. The 
communication ECU acts as a gateway to connect to the remote software distribution 
server via the BS. It is also connected to the local vehicle network (i.e., CAN bus) in 
order to send the software to the targeted ECU. The AC, the SV and BSs are connected 
through high-speed wired/wireless networks, whereas the vehicles that travel between 
cells, can communicate with underlying network via BSs using long-range wireless 
communication links, e.g., cellular or Wi-Fi links. The BS, under which the targeted 
vehicle resides, receives software packets from the SV using secure communication 
technique such as SSL/TLS and transmits the packets to the targeted vehicle through 
secure wireless link as it is shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1 Remote Software Distribution Network using Wireless Link. 
3.1.1 Authentication and Key Agreement Process  
The crypto-ECU of a vehicle mV is pre-loaded with a set of n authentication 
keys ( )n
m
V
m
V
m
V kk ,,
1
L=k . Each key is used to authenticate mV at each software distribution 
session. A copy of these keys will also be kept in a secure Central Server (CS) which is 
maintained by the AC or any trusted party. The AC or any other Certification Authority 
(CA) issues Digital Certificates to the SV and all BSs which contain their authentic 
public-keys. During authentication process, they send the certificate. We assume that all 
the vehicles and the BSs have a copy of the SV’s authentic public key and the BSs have 
their neighboring BSs’ public key.   
When the AC decides to upload software in a vehicle mV , it sends an unused 
authentication key j
mV
k and the module number to which software needs to be uploaded to 
the SV using a secure link such as SSL/TLS. Upon receiving the message, the SV creates 
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a Req_SW_Update_Join message that consists of a message ID, a Vehicle’s ID (VID, 
could be a part of its VIN number), an ECU ID to which the software needs to be updated, 
the version number of the software, a session key k , its rekeying period and time stamp. 
The SV digitally signs it, encrypts the message using j
mV
k and sends it to the BS under 
which mV is currently located. The BS honestly relays the message to mV . After receiving 
the Req_SW_Update_Join message, mV decrypts the message using 
j
mV
k , verifies the 
signature and version number of the software and sends a Ack_SoftwareUpdate_Join 
message. The BS forwards the message to the SV. If authentication fails, the vehicle mV  
ignores the message.  
3.1.2 Sending the Software Packets 
After successful authentication of both the vehicle and the SV, the SV starts 
sending the software packets encrypted with the session key k . The SV can use this key 
to create a MAC value of each software packet and send it along with the packet. The 
vehicle performs the same operation on the software packets to create a new code 
CMA ′ and compares it with the received MAC to verify the data integrity as it is shown 
in Figure 3.2. Since person with the key k is only able to generate the MAC , source 
authentication is also achieved. 
  
41  
 
Figure 3.2 Software Transmission Method. 
Since both parties share the same secret key, anyone who has the key could generate the 
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the unmatched packets. After receiving both the copies along with the signed MDs, the 
vehicle calculates an MD based on the received software and compares it with the 
received MD.  The vehicle accepts the software only when the calculated MD and 
received MD match. 
 
Figure 3.3 Two-copy Software Upload Technique. 
Vehicle receives two copies of 
software with signature in each copy 
Vehicle decrypts software packets, 
verifies signature, decrypts the MDs 
using PuKey of the SV 
Vehicle starts pair-wise packet comparison 
between two copies, requests retransmission 
of unmatched packets until two copies match 
using one of the techniques mentioned here 
Computed MD 
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Vehicle accepts 
the software 
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Figure 3.3 shows the flow diagram of the technique. In the next section we present 
several ways how the vehicle receives two copies of the software and find analytical 
expressions for average number of packet transmissions (N) for successful software 
reception in each case. In order to do the comparison, we also present the expression of N 
for single- copy software upload technique. 
3.2 System Analysis 
In this section, several techniques of how the vehicle receives two copies of the 
software are presented and analytical expressions are found for average number of packet 
transmissions (N) for successful software reception in each case. In order to do the 
comparison, we also present the expression of N for single- copy software upload 
technique. 
3.2.1 Notation 
The symbols and notations that will be used throughout the paper are presented in 
Table 3.1. 
TABLE 3.1 NOTATIONS USED IN UNICAST RSU TECHNIQUE. 
 
Symbol Significance 
M  Total number of software packets without MD 
m  Number of  packets in a segment 
S  
 
Number of segments = 
m
M
 
p  Packet error probability due to hacking 
pairp  Probability that a packet-pair do not match due to 
hacking 
softp  Probability that the received software is in error due 
to hacking 
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T  Average number of trial to send one packet or one 
segment or the total software successfully 
ip  Probability of success in i
th
 trial 
pN  Average number of packet transmission to receive 
one good packet  
N  Average number of packet transmission for 
successful software upload  
 
3.2.2 Definitions 
Figure 3.4 shows different software upload techniques that we consider in the 
analysis. 
 
Figure 3.4 Different Unicast Software Upload Techniques. 
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If there is only one buffer in vehicle’s software module to accept the new software 
and one copy of the software packets is sent appended with the MD then it is called 
Single-copy Software Upload. 
Segmented Single-copy Software Upload 
If the software packets are divided into segments of certain number of packets and 
each segment is sent with the MD then it is called the Segmented Single-copy Software 
Upload.  
Multiple-copy Software Upload 
If there are more than one buffer and multiple copies of the software are sent with 
the MD in each copy until there is a match found then it is called the Multiple-copy 
Software Upload. 
Infinite Buffer Case 
If there are infinite number of buffers to accept multiple copies of the software to 
compare a new copy with the already received copy until a match is found then it is 
called the Infinite Buffer Case.  This is the ideal case and not practical, which requires 
minimum number of packet transmissions for a successful software upload. 
Finite Buffer Case  
If there are two buffers to accept two copies of a packet and one or both of the 
packets are replaced by the new packets transmitted until the vehicle receives a good 
packet then it is called the Finite buffer Case. 
Finite Buffer with Pair Transmission 
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If a packet-pair do not match then the vehicle could delete both packets and 
request to send another pair until a matched pair is found. This case is defined as the 
Finite Buffer with Pair Transmission. 
Finite Buffer with Random Packet Delete 
If a packet-pair do not match then the vehicle could delete one randomly chosen 
packet and request to send another packet until a matched pair is found. This case is 
defined as the Finite Buffer with Random Packet Delete. 
Finite Buffer with Two Consecutive Good Packets 
If a packet-pair do not match then the vehicle always deletes the older packet and 
requests to send another packet until a matched pair is found. This case is defined as the 
Finite Buffer with Two Consecutive Good Packets. 
3.2.3 Single-copy Software Upload 
After receiving all the encrypted software packets and the signature, the receiving 
vehicle decrypts the packets, verifies the signature, calculates an MD and compares it 
with the received MD. If both the MDs match, then the vehicle accepts the software. 
Otherwise, it requests the supplier to retransmit the entire software. In this method, if a 
hacker changes at least one software packet, then the calculated MD will differ from the 
received MD. Since the vehicle or the supplier does not know which packet has been 
changed, the supplier needs to retransmit the entire software including the MD which 
requires more network bandwidth. Moreover, if a hacker can successfully change a 
packet from every transmission, it is not possible at all to upload the software 
successfully. 
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For packet error probability p due to hacking, the probability that the software is 
in error is:  
( ) 111 +−−= Msoft pp         (3.1) 
The average number of trials required to send the software successfully is  
1
1
1
)1(
1
1
1
)1(
+
∞
=
−
−
=
−
=−= ∑ M
softi
i
softsoft
pp
ippT      (3.2) 
The average number of packets transmission for successful software upload is 
( )
( ) 11
1
1
+−
+
=+=
M
p
M
TMN        (3.3) 
3.2.4 Segmented Single-copy Software Upload 
In case of Single-copy Transmission, if the number of software packets M 
increases, the average number of packet transmission for successful software upload 
increases exponentially as shown in eq. (3.3). An alternative approach could be to divide 
M software packets into S  segments with m  packets in each segment. Then the average 
number of trials required sending one segment successfully is  
( ) 11
1
+−
=
m
p
T          (3.4) 
Average number of packet transmission needed for successful upload of S segments is 
( ) ( )
( ) 11
1
1
+−
+
=+=
m
p
Sm
TSmN             (3.5) 
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3.2.5 Multiple-copy Software Upload 
Infinite Buffer Case 
For each software packet, the vehicle first receives two copies of the packet. If the 
packets do not match, it requests to send another copy of the packet. The third copy is 
compared with the previous two. If no match is found it requests for another copy. Since 
there is infinite number of buffers, after receiving thi  packet it compares the packet with 
previous 1−i  packets. The process continues until a matched-pair is found. The 
probability that a packet is received successfully in the thi  trial is 
( ) ∞=−= − ,3,2,1,1 21 LipipP ii        (3.6)   
The average number of packet transmission for successful upload of one packet is 
        
( )
p
PiN
i
ip −
=+=∑
∞
= 1
2
1
1
       (3.7) 
The average number of packet transmission for successful software upload is 
( ) ( )
p
M
NMN p −
+
=+=
1
12
1          (3.8) 
Finite Buffer with Pair Transmission 
In this case, if both the copies of a packet do not match, the supplier will send 
another pair of packets. 
The probability that a pair does not match is 
( )211 pp pair −−=         (3.9) 
The average number of trials to send one packet successfully is  
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The average number of packet transmissions for successful software upload is 
( ) ( )
( )21
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=+=        (3.11) 
Finite Buffer with Two Consecutive Good Packets 
When the two received copies of a packet do not match, the vehicle replaces the 
first copy in buffer 1 with the second copy in buffer 2, requests to send another copy and 
places in buffer 2. The average number of packet transmissions for successful upload of 
one packet is 
( )
( )21 1
2
1
p
p
PiN
i
ip
−
−
=+=∑
∞
=
           (3.12) 
where iP is the probability that a packet is received successfully in the 
thi  trial. 
Then the average number of packet transmissions for successful software upload is 
( ) ( )( )
( )21
21
1
p
pM
NMN p
−
−+
=+=        (3.13)   
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4 CHAPTER 4 – SECURE MULTICASTING FOR RSU IN 
VEHICLES’ ECUS 
4.1 Problem Statement 
Implementing multicast communication in VSDN poses several challenges due to 
many reasons such as:  
1. It consists of highly mobile vehicles that results in frequent handoff and group 
membership change of the MG. Group members moving from one cell to another 
may require synchronized transfer of keying materials between the leaving and 
entering BSs.  
2. If only the GM (the AC or the SV) is responsible for GKM, then it could be 
susceptible to single-point failure. 
3. Broadcast nature of wireless links lacks control on wireless receivers and poses 
more risks of being eavesdropped thus introduce additional complexity in GKM.  
4. Wireless network has different channel characteristics and mobility dynamics that 
make network design and analysis more challenging.  
5. There is limited and variable amount of bandwidth available in both directions 
resulting in inefficient multicast tree and incorrect routing. 
6. Frequent handoff may cause more packet loss and network delay.  
7. For infrastructure-based mobile multicasting putting too much trust on BSs will 
reduce the security of the multicast network. 
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4.2 Design Objectives 
This work aims to achieve the following objectives while designing the GKM 
protocols: 
1. Mutual Authentication and non-repudiation: Vehicles should accept software 
only from legitimate SV. Similarly, the SV should deliver the software to the 
targeted vehicles only. Hence, mutual authentication is needed before transmitting 
the software to vehicle ECUs. In case of dispute, the SV should be reliably identified. 
2. Low communication overhead: Multicast session initialization and handoff should 
not incur high number of messages to be exchanged between the GM and the group 
members. 
3. Minimal trust: The GKM protocol should not put trust on a large number of entities. 
4. Scalability: The scheme should scale well to a large number of receivers.  
5. Single point of failure: The scheme should not rely on a single entity for GKM. 
Otherwise, it would be susceptible to single-point failure. 
6. Low computation: Computation required by the GM and members to process 
keying message should be minimal. 
7. Low storage: The number of keys that the GM and members need to store should be 
low. 
4.3 Assumptions 
In order to facilitate GKM protocols, we make the following assumptions:  
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1. The large multicast group that consists of the SV and the vehicles is divided into 
small subgroups based on region and a Regional Group Manager (RGM) is 
responsible for distributing the software to the vehicles located in its region.    
2. The VSDN consists of BSs and vehicles. Hence, the network dynamic is 
characterized by quasi-permanent mobility and high speed. The vehicle trajectories 
are defined by the roads. Since the road trajectory is known, the number of MG 
members (vehicles) under a BS is predictable and there is a limit of maximum 
number of group members in an MG. Hence, scalability is not a big concern in 
VSDN. 
3. When a vehicle joins (leaves) a new (current) BS, it might join (leave) a new (current) 
MG. However, the new (leaving) member is a vehicle from the same company and 
the software needs to be uploaded in that vehicle. Hence, there is no need to update 
the SK when a vehicle joins (leaves) an MG. Rather, the SK needs to be delivered to 
the joining vehicle. In other words, there is no need for forward and backward 
secrecy. However, periodic key refreshment could be done to protect the system 
security against cryptanalysis attack. 
4. Since the Auto Company will initiate the software update session, the Sender-initiated 
[48] multicast protocol is suitable for this application contrary to receiver-initiated 
group communication in traditional multicast. 
5. All the entities involved in the multicast architecture are time synchronized using an 
appropriate time synchronization protocol such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) or 
Global Positioning System (GPS). 
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6. Unlike other mobile devices such as PDA, vehicles provide sufficient computational 
and power resources. Moreover, exponential increase in processing power and 
related improvements in computational platform will make the vehicle’s processor 
more powerful. This allows vehicle’s processor to compute complex cryptographic 
algorithms.  
4.4 Proposed Multicast Architecture for RSU 
The proposed multicast architecture for RSU hierarchically consists of the AC or 
the ITS authorized software vendor named Central Manager (CM), its regional offices 
known as RGM, the BSs owned by the ITS or other third party wireless vendor and 
vehicles to which software needs to be uploaded (Figure 4.1). The CM administers the 
RGMs; each RGM controls the BSs residing in its region, and each BS manages the 
vehicles under its cell. The CM, RGMs and BSs are connected through high speed 
wired/wireless links, whereas vehicles can communicate with their respective BSs using 
wireless communication links, e.g., cellular, Wi-MAX, IEEE 802.20 or Wi-Fi.  The 
software packets are first routed to the RGMs from the CM using  
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Figure 4.1 The Multicast Architecture for RSU. 
secure channels such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In case of the FT 
system, each RGM forms an IP-based reliable and secure multicast group with its 
underlying BSs named RGM-BS multicast group and transmits the packets to the BSs. 
Again, the nearby BSs under an RGM form clusters and each cluster along with the 
vehicles under it forms a BS-vehicle group named as Multicast Group (MG). The MG is 
divided into two subgroups: Data Group (DG) that comprises all the vehicles and 
Control Group (CG) that comprises all the BSs in an MG. Upon successful reception of 
software packets from the RGM, each CG forwards the packets to the DG using secure 
and reliable wireless multicasting. In case of the ST system, the CG is not trusted. Hence, 
the RGM sends the packets to DG using CG as proxy to reliably forward the packets to 
DG. 
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4.5 Group Key Management Protocols 
4.5.1 Notation 
The symbols and notation that will be used throughout the paper is presented in Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1 NOTATION USED IN GKM PROTOCOLS FOR WIRELESS MULTICASTING. 
{ }
RN
RR ,,1 L=R  Set of RGMs owned by the Auto Company or ITS with 
cardinality RN  
{ }NBB ,,1 L=B  Set of BSs owned by the ITS or other 3
rd
 party wireless 
vendor with cardinality N  
{ }i
N
ii
i
B
B,B ,1 L=B  Set of BSs under an RGM iR with cardinality 
i
BN  
{ }i
N
ii
i
V
V,V ,1 L=V  Set of vehicles under an RGM iR with cardinality 
i
VN  
{ }i
N
ii
i
CG
CG,CG ,1 L=CG  Set of Control Groups under an RGM iR with cardinality 
i
CGN  
BN  Number of BSs in a CG or MG 
{ }i
N
ii
i
M
M,M ,1 L=M  
Set of MG/CG under an RGM iR with cardinality 
B
i
Bi
M
N
N
N =   
( ){B = +− i
B
Nm
i
B
Nm
i
m ,B,B .11 L
 
Set of BSs within an MG under an RGM iR where 
i
MNm ,,1L=  
i
Lm
B  Group leader BS of a CG/MG 
i
mM   
VV ⊆








=
i
jVM
Ni
jM
,V,V L1  
Set of vehicles within a DG or MG 
i
ji
j
MV
Ni
jB
,V,V VV ⊆






= L1  
Set of vehicles under a BS 
i
jB  
kT  Re-keying period of key k 
k ′  Updated key for key k 
l
Vm
k  Authentication key of mV for l
th
 software update session 
Ek  Symmetric encryption with key k 
ASign  Digital Signature of entity A 
AP  Authentic public key of an entity A 
1−
AP  Private key of an entity A 
∀  For all 
∈  In 
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4.5.2 RGMs, BSs and Vehicles Authentication Keys and Digital Certificates 
We assume that the AC or any other Certification Authority (CA) issues Digital 
Certificates to all the RGMs and BSs which contain their authentic public keys, the CA’s 
public key and the validity period of the certificate. The CA provides them with new 
certificates when the validity period is about to expire. Each RGM (BS) pair-wise share a 
secret key with its respective authority i.e., CM (RGM) known as RGM (BS) 
Authentication Key. This key could be pre-distributed or established during the session 
initialization phase using Diffie–Hellman key establishment protocol secured with the 
signature scheme [21, 45, 49]. Each vehicle is equipped with several ECUs such as 
Communication ECU, Crypto ECU, and GPS ECU etc. The Crypto ECU is pre-loaded 
with a set of keys known as Vehicle Authentication Keys. Both the CM’s secure server 
and the regional office’s secure server, to which the vehicle is registered, keep a copy of 
the keys. Each key is used to authenticate the vehicle at each software distribution 
session. When all the keys are used, the RGM sends another set of key.  
4.5.3 Multicast Session Initialization  
Multicast session initialization comprises the authentication of CM, RGMs, BSs 
and the vehicles; generation of a SK for an MG and secure distribution of the SK to the 
group members. Since CM, RGMs and BSs are fixed and construct the wired part of the 
network, they can easily be authenticated by their respective authority using any standard 
mutual authentication technique. The authentication of vehicles and distribution of SK to 
them makes the non-trivial part of the network. Hence, we describe the vehicle 
authentication process and distribution of SK to them below. 
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4.5.3.1 Fully-Trusted System 
In the FT system, we assume that each CG in an MG decides on a group leader 
(
i
Lm
B ) who is responsible for generating the SK for that MG. The group leader could be 
randomly selected by the RGM. The group leader 
i
Lm
B authenticates itself using a 
standard authentication protocol and establishes a shared secret with other group 
members. It generates a CG key iCGmk and distributes it to other members during the 
authentication process. After successful authentication, it generates multicast SK, its 
rekeying period and multicasts it to each member in a CG encrypted with iCGmk along with 
its signature. Each BS in a CG verifies the signature, retrieves the SK and constructs a 
Req_DG_Join message that consist of its own ID, the RGM’s ID to which it belongs to, a 
multicast group ID, a message ID, a VID, an ECU ID, the version number of the 
software, time stamp and its digital certificate. It digitally signs the message and 
broadcasts it along with the signature.  
)(,__Re: HSignJoinDGqB i
j
i
j BB
i
j V⇒  where H is the hash of the message. 
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Figure 4.2 State Transition Diagram of Vehicle during Multicast Session 
Establishment for both the FT and ST Systems. 
 
Since a vehicle under a BS may be moving while receiving the Req_DG_Join message, it 
may need hand-off any time. We developed a robust algorithm that can handle any 
number of handoffs that may be performed by a vehicle during multicast session 
establishment which is described below. Figure 4.2 shows the vehicle’s state transition 
diagram during multicast session establishment for both the FT and ST systems. 
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Whenever handoff is needed, the vehicle sends Req_Handoff_Joining message to the 
joining BS and Notify_Handoff_Leaving message to the leaving BS.   
1. Suppose a vehicle mV of VID type is under the BS 0B while receiving Req_DG_Join 
message as shown in Figure 4.1. It verifies the signature, timestamp and version number 
of the software to determine whether it should join the multicast session. If it is still 
under 0B , it sends Ack_DG_Join message to 0B that includes its VIN. Else if it moves 
to 1B , it sends Ack_DG_Join message to the joining BS 1B mentioning that it received the 
Ack_DG_Join message from 0B . After that it goes to V3_WaitForKey state to wait for 
multicast SK from the BS. 
JoinDGAckBBVm __:)( 10→          
2. While mV is in V3_WaitForKey state, if handoff is needed it sends 
Req_Handoff_Joining message, consists of its VIN, message ID, leaving BS ID to the 
joining BS and Notify_Handoff_Leaving message, consists of its VIN, message ID, 
joining BS ID to the leaving BS. It returns to the V3_WaitForKey state. 
JoiningHandoffqBBVm __Re:)( 21→  
LeavingHandoffNotifyBBVm __:)( 10→  
3. When 0B ( 1B ) starts processing the Ack_DG_Join message sent by mV , it checks its 
buffer to verify whether mV has already sent handoff notification. Accordingly, it 
determines the current location of mV  (i.e., current BS and RGM under which mV  resides). 
The 0B ( 1B ) forwards mV ’s VIN and current location to its corresponding RGM 0R .  
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BSToRGMJoinDGAckRBB ___:)( 010 →  
4. 0R saves the current location of mV , uses mV ’s VIN to find the next unused 
authentication key jVmk either from its own database or from the CM.  
RGMToCMJoinDGAckCMR ___:0→   
( )CMToRGMKeysAuthVehicleMsgEkRCM R ____:
0
0→   
5. If mV resides under a BS which is administered by 0R (e.g., 0B  or 1B in (Figure 4.1), 
0R transfers
j
Vm
k to the corresponding BS ( 0B or 1B ) encrypted with that BS’s shared secret 
with 0R .  Otherwise, it follows step 7. 
( )KeysAuthVehicleMsgEkBBR BB ___:)( )(100 10→   
6. After retrieving jVmk , 0B ( 1B ) again checks its buffer for any handoff notification from 
mV . If not found, 
a. 0B ( 1B ) sends Msg_Session_key message to mV that contains multicast 
group Id of the MG to which it belongs to, multicast SK and its re-keying 
period, encrypted with jVmk . It also contains BS’s digital certificate if 
mV joins the BS through handoff.  
( )KeySessionMsgEkVBB j
m
Vm __:)( 10 →   
b. mV retrieves the SK by decrypting the message using the same key
j
Vm
k and 
sends Ack_Session_Key encrypted with jVmk to 0B ( 1B ) if it is still under the 
coverage area of 0B ( 1B ).  
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)__(:)( 10 KeySessionAckEkBBV
j
m
Vm →   
        Else, mV notifies handoff to 0B ( 1B ). After receiving handoff message   
from mV , 0B ( 1B ) follows step 8. 
c. After verifying Ack_Session_Key message received from mV , 0B ( 1B ) adds 
mV to its DG list.  
7. Else if mV resides under a BS which is administered by another RGM, e.g., 2B in Figure 
4.1 administered by 1R , 0R transfers 
j
Vm
k to the joining RGM 1R  encrypted with 1R ’s 
public key. Consequently, 1R sends 
j
Vm
k to 2B encrypted with 2B ’s shared secret with 1R  
and 2B  follows step 6.  
)(,)____(:
01
10 HSignLeavingRGMFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgRR RPR→   
8. The leaving BS 0B ( 1B ) transmits 
j
Vm
k to the joining BS (
1B ) if mV is still under the 
same RGM ( 0R ) encrypted with the receiver’s public key and digital signature. 
)(,)____(:)()( )(
)
(1110 10
1
1
HSignLeavingBSFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgRBBB BB
P
P
R
B
→  
Otherwise, it forwards the handoff message to leaving RGM ( 0R ) and 0R follows step 7. 
Ultimately, the joining BS receives the authentication key and follow step d to 
authenticate mV and provide it with the SK.  
4.5.3.2 Semi-trusted System 
Since in the ST system BSs are not trusted, the RGM authenticates the vehicles 
and provides them with the SK. Multicast session initialization steps are: 
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1. Each RGM generates session keys and their rekeying period for all the MGs 
administered by it. It generates Req_DG_Join message, signs it and broadcasts to 
the underlying BSs. 
i
B
ii
jR
i
ji NjBforHSignJoinDGqBR i ,,3,2,1,)(,__Re: L=∈∀→ B  
2. Each BS forwards this message to the vehicles residing its cell. 
)(,__Re: HSignJoinDGqB
i
i
j
RB
i
j V⇒  
3. Using the similar procedure as it is in FT system, a vehicle mV under the BS 0B  
(Figure 4.1) sends Ack_DG_Join message to 0B or 1B   depending on whether 
mV needs handoff or not and goes to V3_WaitForKey state . 0B ( 1B ) forwards this 
message to 0R . 
JoinDGAckBBVm __:)( 10→   
JoinDGAckRBB __:)( 010 →    
4. While mV is in V3_WaitForKey state, if handoff is needed it sends 
Req_Handoff_Joining message, to the joining BS and Notify_Handoff_Leaving 
message to the leaving BS. It returns to the V3_WaitForKey state. 
JoiningHandoffqBBVm __Re:)( 21→  
LeavingHandoffNotifyBBVm __:)( 10→  
The BS 0B ( 1B ) forwards the handoff leaving message to 0R . Similarly, 1B ( 2B ) 
forwards handoff joining message to the RGM )( 10 RR . 
LeavingHandoffNotifyRBB __:)( 010 →  
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JoiningHandoffqRRBB __Re:)()( 1021 →  
5. When 0R starts processing Ack_DG_Join message sent by mV , it checks its’ buffer 
for any handoff notify message related to mV . Accordingly, it finds the current 
location of mV . 0R finds mV ’s authentication key 
j
Vm
k  as it is in the FT system either 
from it’s own database or from the CM.  
( )RGMToCMJoinDGAckEkCMR R ___:
0
0→   
( )CMToRGMKeysAuthVehicleMsgEkRCM R ____:
0
0→   
6. If mV resides under a BS within its region (e.g., 0B  or 1B ), 0R sends the SK of the 
related MG to 0B ( 1B ) encrypted with 
j
Vm
k . Otherwise, it follows step 10. 
  ( )KeySessionMsgEkBBR j
m
V __:)( 100 →   
7. Meanwhile, if 0B ( 1B ) receives handoff notify message from mV , it forwards it to 
0R as it is in step 4 and 0R takes action as it is in step 6. Also, 0B ( 1B ) forwards the 
SK to mV . 
   ( )KeySessionMsgEkVBB j
m
Vm __:)( 10 →   
8. mV  decrypts the SK and sends Ack_Session_Key encrypted with
j
Vm
k to 0B ( 1B ) if it 
is still under the coverage area of 0B ( 1B ). Otherwise, it notifies handoff to the 
leaving BS and the leaving BS forwards it to the respective RGM. The RGM 
follows step 6.   
  )__(:)( 10 KeySessionAckEkBBV
j
m
Vm →  
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9. 0B ( 1B ) forwards the Ack_Session_Key message to 0R , 0R decrypts and verifies it. 
If verification is successful, 0R adds mV to the right DG group. 0R also sends a 
message to 0B ( 1B ) to register mV to its list of vehicles.  
)___(:)( 010 BSToRGMKeySessionAckEkRBB
j
m
V→  
10. If mV ’s current location is under a BS (e.g., 2B )  which is administered by another 
RGM (e.g., 1R ),  the leaving RGM 0R   sends  
j
Vm
k to the joining RGM 1R encrypted 
with 1R ’s public key. 1R  follows step 6. 
)(,)____(:
01
10 HSignLeavingRGMFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgRR RPR→  
4.5.4 Hand-off during Multicast Session 
We categorize handoff as three different types: a BS-level handoff is performed 
when a vehicle moves from one cell to another within the same MG, an MG-level handoff 
is performed when a vehicle moves from one cell to another under a different MG 
managed by the same RGM and an RGM-level handoff is performed when a vehicle 
moves from one cell to another under different RGM.  
4.5.4.1 Fully-trusted System 
1. While receiving multicast data if a vehicle mV detects that it is entering into a new 
cell (by comparing signal strength or any other standard method), it sends 
Req_Handoff_Joining message to the joining BS ( 1B  or 2B ) in response to the 
beacon signal received from the joining BS. The Req_Handoff_Joining message 
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consist of its VIN, the multicast group ID, the RGM ID, the old BS’s ID and the 
sequence number of the last message it received. It also sends 
Req_Handoff_Leaving message to the leaving BS ( 0B or 1B ) that contains its VIN 
and joining BS’s ID encrypted with jVmk .  
JoiningHandoffqBBVm __Re:)( 21→  
)__(:)( 10 LeavingHandoffNotifyEkBBV
j
m
Vm →   
2. The leaving BS 0B transfers 
j
Vm
k to 1B encrypted with 1B ’s public key along with its 
digital signature. The joining BS 1B sends Ack_Handoff_Joining message to 
mV that consist of its ID, public key and time stamp. If it’s an MG-level handoff 
then, the Ack_Handoff_Joining also contains the SK and its expiration period. 
Upon receiving the SK, mV sends Ack_Session_Key message to 1B . In both cases,  
0B  deletes mV from its member list and 1B adds it to the list. 
)(,)____(:
01
10 HSignLeavingBSFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgBB BPB→  
)__(:1 JoiningHandoffAckEkVB
j
m
Vm→  
)__(:1 KeySessionAckEkBV
j
m
Vm →  
3. If its an RGM-level handoff then the leaving BS 1B forwards the handoff 
notification message to its RGM 0R . 0R sends 
Msg_Vehicle_AuthKey_From_LeavingRGM message to 1R encrypted with 1R ’s 
public key along with its signature. 1R forwards 
j
Vm
k to  1B follows step 2. 
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)__(:
101
LeavingHandoffNotifyEkRB B→  
)(,)____(:
01
10 HSignLeavingRGMFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgRR RPR→  
)__(:
221
AuthKeyVehicleMsgEkBR B→  
)__(:2 JoiningHandoffAckEkVB
j
m
Vm→  
)__(:2 KeySessionAckEkBV
j
m
Vm →  
Note that, while waiting for response from the joining BS, mV might move to new cell. 
That is why before sending Ack_Handoff_Joining message, the joining BS checks its 
buffer for handoff leaving message from mV . If there is any then it follows step 2.  
4.5.4.2 Semi-trusted System   
1. Similar to FT-system, the vehicle mV sends Req_Handoff_Joining message to the 
joining BS ( 1B ) and Req_Handoff_Leaving message to the leaving BS ( 0B ). In all 
cases, the joining and leaving BSs forward the messages to their corresponding 
RGMs. 
JoiningHandoffqBBVm __Re:)( 21→  
)__(:)( 10 LeavingHandoffNotifyEkBBV
j
m
Vm →   
JoiningHandoffqRRBB __Re:)()( 1021 →  
)__(:)( 010 LeavingHandoffNotifyEkRBB
j
m
V→   
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2. If it is a BS- or MG-level handoff, then the RGM 0R  sends Ack_Handoff_Joinig 
message to mV  encrypted with 
j
Vm
k  via the joining BS 1B and mV sends 
Ack_Session_Key message to the RGM via 1B .  
)__(:10 JoiningHandoffAckEkBR
j
m
V→  
)__(:11 JoiningHandoffAckEkVB
j
m
Vm→  
)__(:1 KeySessionAckEkBV
j
m
Vm →  
)__(:01 KeySessionAckEkRB
j
m
V→  
3. If it is an RGM-level handoff then the leaving RGM 0R  sends 
Msg_Vehicle_AuthKey_From_LeavingRGM message to 1R encrypted with 1R ’s 
public key along with its signature. 1R verifies the message, checks it buffer  to 
see whether mV already moved away from the cell. If yes, then 1R follows step 2. 
Otherwise, 1R  sends Ack_Handoff_Joining message to mV that contains the SK of 
new MG encrypted with jVmk via 1B . The mV sends Ack_Session_Key message to 
the RGM via 1B .  
)(,)____(:
01
10 HSignLeavingRGMFromAuthKeyVehicleMsgRR RPR→  
)__(:21 JoiningHandoffAckEkBR
j
m
V→  
)__(:2 JoiningHandoffAckEkVB
j
m
Vm→  
)__(:2 KeySessionAckEkBV
j
m
Vm →  
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)__(:12 KeySessionAckEkRB
j
m
V→  
4.5.5 Periodic Re-keying 
Periodic re-keying updates symmetric encryption keys after a certain interval. If a 
cryptographic key is being employed for a longer time period, the higher the chance that 
the key is going to be successfully cryptanalyzed. As we mentioned earlier, re-keying is 
not necessary for our software upload multicast session when a member joins/leaves a 
multicast group. However, in order to prevent any cryptanalysis attack, we recommend 
for periodic re-keying of multicast keys for both data and control multicast groups. The 
period of re-keying depends on the key size and the cryptographic algorithm used to 
encrypt the multicast data.  
4.5.5.1 Fully-trusted System 
In FT-system, the re-keying of multicast SK is initiated and controlled by the 
group leader
i
Lm
B . The
i
Lm
B generates the new SK ( mk ′ ) and its expiration period, prepares 
Msg_Rekeying_SK message that consist of the message ID, new SK, its expiration period, 
revision number and timestamp. It delivers it to other members encrypted with iCGmk and 
its digital signature. Each BS verifies the message and multicasts it to underlying vehicles 
encrypted with the current mk . Upon receiving the new SK, the mV verifies it. If it is not 
received successfully, it sends a NACK message to the BS encrypted with its 
authentication key.   
)(),_Re_(: HSignSKkeyingMsgEkB i
mL
mm B
i
CG
i
m
i
L B⇒  
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)(),_Re_(: HSignSKkeingMsgEkB
ii BmBi
V⇒  
)_(: SKNACKEkBV j
mV
im →  if new SK is not received successfully. 
4.5.5.2 Semi-trusted System 
In ST-system, the RGM initiates and controls the re-keying process. It generates 
the new SK ( mk ′ ) and its re-keying period, prepares Msg_Rekeying_SK message, encrypts 
with current SK ( mk ), digitally signs it and multicasts it to the underlying vehicles via the 
BSs. If a vehicle cannot receive the new SK successfully, it sends the NACK as it is in 
FT system and the BS forwards it to the RGM.  
)(),_Re_(: HSignSKkeyingMsgEkR
iRm
i
mi B⇒  
)(),_Re_(: HSignSKkeyingMsgEkB
ii RmBi
V⇒  
)_(: SKNACKEkBV j
mV
im →  
)_(: SKNACKEkRB j
mV
ii →  
In summary, the re-keying message can be sent as other multicast messages. 
4.6 System Analysis 
4.6.1 Cryptographic Overhead Analysis 
The confidentiality of the messages exchanged during multicast session 
establishment procedure is ensured by using symmetric key encryption technique and the 
authenticity is guaranteed through digital signature. We assume AES (Advanced 
Encryption System) for symmetric key cryptography which is a symmetric-key 
  
70  
encryption standard adopted by US Government [50] .  It is a symmetric block cipher 
where block size is fixed to 128 bits and the key size could be 128, 192 or 256 bits. 
Accordingly, the AES standard comprises three block ciphers: AES-128, AES-192 and 
AES-256 adopted from a larger collection originally published as Rijndael. Here, we 
assume AES-128. The AES cipher is specified as a number of repetitions of 
transformation rounds that convert the input plaintext into the final output of ciphertext. 
Each round consists of several processing steps, including one that depends on the 
encryption key. A set of reverse rounds are applied to transform ciphertext back into the 
original plaintext using the same encryption key. According to [51], let B4 , K4 , and 
R denote the block size (in bytes), key length (in bytes) and number of rounds of Rijndael, 
respectively and andT , orT and shiftT  denote the numbers of processing cycles required for 
performing basic operations of  a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise 
SHIFT, respectively. Then the total number of processing cycles (PC) to encrypt a block 
is given by: 
)1]()9664()1231(46[
)31116(
−++++
+++=
RTBTBBT
BTBTBTT
shiftorand
shiftorandE
      (4.1) 
The total number of processing cycles to decrypt a block is given by: 
)1]()9632(
)12122(161[)31116(
−++
+++++=
RTB
TBBTBTBTBTT
shift
orandshiftorandD
   (4.2) 
Let L denotes the payload size in a frame in bytes, then the number of processing 
cycles to encrypt and decrypt the frame are as follows, respectively, 
EEE T
B
L
T
B
L
O 


=



×
×
=
484
8
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L
T
B
L
O 


=



×
×
=
484
8
        (4.3) 
For AES-128, 4=B and 10=R and if we assume 1=== shiftorand TTT , then 6168=ET  
and 12432=DT  PC. Then the processing time to encrypt and decrypt a frame is  
f
Tt EPE
1
∗= , 
f
Tt DPD
1
∗= where f is the speed of the processor. 
For digital signature generation and verification, we assume DSA (Digital 
Signature Algorithm) with key 1024-bit key length and SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) 
which is used in DSS (Digital Signature Standard) [52]. The DSA is used to provide data 
integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. In [53], the performance of popular public-
key encryption algorithms and hash functions, such as DSA and Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) was studied. They showed that on an 8-bit commercial microcontrollers 
running at 10 MHz, the processing time of signing with DSA is 100 ms and verifying the 
signature is 160 ms. Now-a-days, vehicle’s ECUs usually use 16- and 32-bit 
microcontroller that run at 66~132 MHZ. Current advancement in vehicular technology 
may require for higher speed processor. In this paper, we assume microcontroller with 
speed 500 MHz for vehicle’s ECUs and 1 GHz processor for BSs and RGMs.  
4.6.2 Receiving Buffer Delay/Queue Delay Model  
The CM, RGMs and BSs maintain a FIFO buffer for message reception and 
processing. Queue delay is the time that a message has to wait in the buffer of an RGM or 
a BS for service.  The service time is mainly the time to send a message either through 
the wired or the wireless channel. Since wired channel is assumed noise free and 
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bandwidth is fixed, the message transmission delay can be assumed to be “Deterministic”. 
On the other hand, the wireless channel is noisy due to path loss and the bandwidth is 
limited and variable. Hence, the message transmission delay can be modeled as 
“General” [19]. The buffer size is assumed to be high so that no message is dropped 
while receiving. Thus, the queue delay of entities that send message through wired and 
wireless channel can be modeled as an 1// DM  and 1// GM queue, respectively.  For 
1// GM queue, the average waiting time in the queue, )(WE  is given by [54] 
)1(2
][
][
2
ρ
λ
−
== DRB
TE
WEt        (4.4) 
where ][ DTE is the mean processing time of a message, ][ DTEλρ =  is the server load 
and λ is the message arrival rate  for Poisson arrival process. 
For deterministic service time, )(WE is given by,  
)1(2
][
][
ρ
ρ
−
== DRB
TE
WEt        (4.5) 
4.6.3 Transmit Buffer Delay 
The transmit buffer delay is the time that elapse between the time when a message 
is ready to send and access the channel using CSMA/CD or CSMA/CA channel access 
mechanism in wired or wireless channel, respectively. In wired part of the network, the 
delay model for 1-persistent CSMA/CD is used which is described in Section 2.1. In the 
wireless part, the delay model for CSMA/CA with BEB is used which is described on 
Section 2.2. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 – RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
5.1 Simulation Model  
For unicast software upload, we generated a uniformly distributed random 
number using drand48() function in C++ with gcc compiler for a particular packet error 
probability p due to hacking. If the random number is less than p then the packet was 
considered as a bad packet and vice versa.  
In order to simulate wireless multicasting, we developed an integrated Vehicular 
Wireless Communication Network (VNET) simulator which combines a realistic traffic 
mobility model and a wireless communication network model based on DEVS (Discrete 
Event System Specification) [55]. The software tool “DEVS#” [56] is used for modeling 
and simulation of the proposed multicast architecture. It is an object-oriented 
implementation of the DEVS formalism written in C# language. The details of the DEVS 
theory and VSDN simulator is presented in Appendix A. 
We simulate 100 miles of an uninterrupted four lanes freeway with macroscopic 
traffic flow model where vehicles move at a speed determined by the speed limit of the 
road. Four levels of constant speeds, 75, 70, 65 and 60 mph, are taken into account, 
which can be considered as speed limit in each different lane. Vehicles are generated 
from a Poisson process with a parameter λ veh/hr. A vehicle entering under a BS’s cell 
computes its speed using a truncated version of normal distribution with mean as the 
speed limit of the road and standard deviation 10% of the speed limit [57].  The range of 
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each BS is assumed to be 2 miles. For communication network simulator, we simulated 
MAC and physical layers of both wired and wireless communication channels.  In the 
wired part of the network we implemented CSMA/CD and in the wireless part, 
CSMA/CA channel access mechanisms. For receiving part of wired channel, we assumed 
noiseless channel, hence all successfully transmitted packets are guaranteed to be 
received by the destination. On the other hand, the wireless channel is assumed noisy and 
simulation results are collected for varying Packet Error Rate (PER). The values of other 
parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 5.1. 
TABLE 5.1 VARIOUS PARAMETERS VALUES USED IN SIMULATION. 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Range of BS, R 2 mile Wireless Control 
rate 
1 Mbps 
Wired Bus speed, C 10 Mbps PHY header 192 bits 
Slot time for wired channel, σ 51.2 µS MAC Header 224 bits 
Propagation Delay for wired 
channel, δ 
26 µS ACK packet 112 bits 
+ PHY  
Jam time after collision, tJ 3.2 µS Initial Backoff 
Window size 
32 
Retry Limit for wired channel, M 16 Maximum 
backoff stage 
5 
Wireless Channel Bit Rate, R 10 Mbps Wireless Retry 
Limit 
7 
Slot time for wireless channel, σw 20 µS DIFS 50 µS 
Wireless propagation delay 1 µS SIFS 10 µS 
 
5.2 Performance Analysis of Unicast Software Upload  
Figure 5.1 and Table 5.2 show the resemblance between the analytical and 
simulation results for the average number of packet transmissions for the Single-copy and 
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Multiple-copy software upload techniques, respectively. For the Single-copy transmission, 
at higher p the average numbers of packet transmissions (N) for successful software 
upload increases exponentially as the software size increases. However, if the software is 
sent in segmented form, it reduces N considerably. Figure 5.2 exemplifies the effect of 
segmentation for the software size with 1024 packets and different number of segments. 
The more the number of segments, the lesser is the number of packet transmissions 
necessary for successful software upload. Conversely, as the number of segments 
increases, it might take more time to encrypt, decrypt and transmit all the segments. 
Hence, there should be a trade-off between number of segments and processing time.  
The two-copy software upload is always superior to the Single-copy software 
upload as long as security is concerned. Since the second copy will be transmitted after a 
random time interval in a random packet order, it is very unlikely that an intruder would 
know whether a second copy will be transmitted or not. Moreover, even if an intruder 
changes one packet of the first copy, it would be difficult for him to change the same 
packet in the second copy due to the randomness of packet transmission. Figure 5.3 
shows the average number of packet transmissions ( pN ) to upload a single packet 
successfully in the multiple-copy software upload scenario. Unlike the single-copy 
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Single-copy Transmission: Analytical vs. Simulation
 
 
 M = 1024, Simulation
M = 1024, Analytical
M = 512, Simulation
M = 512, Analytical
 
Figure 5.1 Comparison of Analytical and Simulation Results for Single-copy 
Software Upload Technique. 
 
software upload, the total number of packet transmissions necessary to upload the entire 
software is linearly dependent on the software size (eq. (3.8), (3.11) and (3.13)). For 
lower values of p, on an average only two packets need to be transmitted for any of the 
techniques mentioned here.  For higher values of p, Finite Buffer with Random Packet 
Delete requires the least number of packet transmissions with respect to the ideal case 
where we have infinite number of buffers. In general, the hacking probability is very low. 
Thus, any of the techniques could be used if there are one or more unmatched packet 
pairs. In addition, N does not vary notably between the two-buffer case and infinite- 
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TABLE 5.2 COMPARISON OF ANLYTICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS OF DOUBLE COPY 
SOFTWARE TRANSMISSION. 
Infinite Buffer 
Finite Buffer with 
Pair Transmission 
Finite Buffer with 
Two Consecutive 
Good Packets 
Finite 
Buffer 
with 
Random 
Packet 
Delete 
            
p 
Np 
(Sim.) 
 
Np 
(Analytical) 
 
Np 
(Sim.) 
 
Np 
(Analytical) 
 
Np 
(Sim.) 
 
Np 
(Analytical) 
 
Np 
(Sim.) 
 
0.1 2.2228 2.2222 2.4704 2.4691 2.3443 2.3457 2.2847 
0.01 2.0204 2.0202 2.0406 2.0406 2.0303 2.0304 2.0253 
0.001 2.0020 2.0020 2.0040 2.0040 2.0031 2.0030 2.0024 
0.0001 2.0002 2.0002 2.0004 2.0004 2.0003 2.0003 2.0003 
0.00001 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 
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Effect of Segmentation
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Figure 5.2 Effect of segmentation on Single-copy Software Upload for M = 1024. 
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buffer case. Addition of more buffers would not increase the performance of software 
upload remarkably. Consequently, we propose to use not more than two buffers in 
vehicle’s software modules to upload two copies of software. 
 At lower p, single-copy software upload requires fewer number of packet 
transmission than the multiple-copy software upload. However, the later technique offers 
additional security if the software packets are transmitted in random order and the second 
copy is transmitted after a random time-interval with a long average value. 
 
Figure 5.3 Average number of packet transmission ( ) for successful upload of a 
single packet for Two-copy software Upload. 
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5.3 Performance Analysis of Multicast Software Upload 
In measuring the efficiency of the proposed GKM protocols, we consider the 
criteria referred in Section 2.7. We find the communication overhead, computation 
overhead and storage overhead of multicast session initialization and handoff procedures, 
for both the FT and ST systems. We also show the performance of the proposed protocols 
in terms of scalability, bandwidth requirements, strength against security attacks and cost 
requirements. Since re-keying of SK can be considered as an additional multicast data, 
the overhead for this procedure has not been evaluated. 
5.3.1 Communication Overhead 
In finding the communication delay, we add up the Round Trip Delay, RTDT  of 
each message to be successfully transmitted between two nodes, used in the protocol. 
The RTDT consists of the transmission delay Dt , receiving buffer delay ( RBt ) and processing 
delay ( Pt ) at destination node. In Figure 5.4, the delay performance of 1-persistent 
CSMA/CD is plotted for 44.0=a . As the offered load increases, the average time to 
transmit a packet increases. Note that, average packet transmission time for wired part of 
the network is in the range of ms.  
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Figure 5.4 Average Message Transmission Delay of Wire Network for Normalized 
Propagation Delay a = 0.44. 
 
From the wireless message transmission delay model it is seen that the distribution of 
message transmission delay mainly depends on the pseudo collision 
probability p whereas the maximum value of p is determined by the number of active 
stations, n . Table 5.3 shows maximum value of p for different number of stations and 
different PER. Figure 5.5 shows the average packet transmission delay ][ DTE as a 
function of n  for different PER. From Figure 5.5 it is seen that for lower values of PER, 
][ DTE  hardly depends on PER. However, for higher values of PER, ][ DTE  increases 
with PER. Packet arrival rate at each station is adopted from simulation and the receiving  
 
TABLE 5.3 SATURATION VALUE OF COLLISION PROBABILITY 
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n  
Max p  
(PER = 
0.0001) 
Max p  
(PER = 
0.0025) 
Max  
(PER = 
0.001) p  
Max p  
(PER = 
0.01) 
Max p  
(PER = 
0.05) 
10 0.2899 0.291 0.2903 0.2942 0.3116 
15 0.3555 0.3558 0.3553 0.3584 0.3722 
20 0.4 0.4007 0.4003 0.4029 0.4148 
25 0.43429 0.4349 0.4345 0.4368 0.4475 
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Figure 5.5 Average message transmission delay of CSMA/CA protocol. 
buffer delay is calculated using equations (4.4) and (4.5) for wireless and wired channel, 
respectively.  
In measuring the performance of proposed GKM protocols, we calculate the 
Multicast Session Initialization Latency ( IL ) and Hand-off Latency ( HL ) of the proposed 
GKM protocols. The IL is defined as the average time elapse between the submission of 
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an Ack_DG_Join message by a vehicle and the reception of Ack_Session_Key message by 
the BS (in the FT system) or RGM (in the ST system). The HL is defined as the average 
time elapsed between the submission of Req_Handoff_Joining message by the vehicle 
and the reception of Ack_Session_Key message by the BS or RGM depending on FT or 
ST system, respectively.  
Let, 
IT = Multicast initialization latency per vehicle in the absence of any handoff. 
RMB NNN ,, = Number of BS-, MG- and RGM-level handoff per vehicle during session 
initialization, respectively. 
RMB TTT ,, = Additional delay incurred for BS-, MG- and RGM-level handoff, 
respectively. Then, 
RRMMBBII TNTNTNTL *+∗+∗+=  
The values of RMB NNN ,,  are adopted from simulation. In measuring IL , we 
investigated the effect of the CG-size (no. of BSs/CG), vehicle arrival rate (λi veh/hr/lane) 
and wireless PER. In general, the ST system takes few ms higher times than the FT 
system and initialization latency increases considerably with the number of handoff that 
occurs during session establishment. From the multicast session initialization technique 
described above, it is noted that both the FT and ST systems require same number of 
wireless messages whereas the ST system requires more number of wired messages. 
However, wired message transmission delay is insignificant compared to the wireless 
message transmission delay. Handoff during session initialization requires vehicle’s 
authentication key to be transferred to the joining BS/RGM (FT/ST system), the joining 
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BS/RGM needs to send its public key to the vehicle and the vehicle needs to be sent the 
SK of new MG. These additional messages required to adopt handoff increases the IL . 
TABLE 5.4 EFFECT OF CG-SIZE ON MULTICAST INITIALIZATION LATENCY ( IL ) 
    (PER = 0.0001, ln//200 hrvehi =λ , NO. OF RGM = 2). 
 
Fully-Trusted System Semi-Trusted System CG-
Size 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
1 2.3374[2.2609,2.4141] 2.3606 2.4956[2.3438,2.6474] 2.4228 
3 2.3964[2.2506,2.5422] 2.3705 2.4384[2.3494,2.5274] 2.4077 
4 2.3318[2.2614,2.4021] 2.3412 2.4223[2.2558,2.6689] 2.4114 
5 2.3421[2.2837,2.4003] 2.3601 2.4606[2.4174,2.5037] 2.419 
 
The number of BSs in a CG (i.e., CG-size) determine the number of MG under an 
RGM, i.e., 
B
i
Bi
M
N
N
N = . As the CG-size ( BN ) decreases, the number of MG, 
i
M
N  
increases. Thus, the MG-level handoff increases. However, multicast session initialization 
technique handles both the BS- and MG-level handoff in a similar fashion. In both cases, 
the leaving BS needs to send the vehicle authentication key to the joining BS and the 
joining BS authenticate the vehicle and send the SK. Therefore, the CG-size does not 
have any significant effect on IL . Table 5.4 shows the effect of CG-size on IL for both 
FT and ST system. However, during multicast session if the CG-size is larger the vehicle 
does not need to get the new SK when moving from one BS to another unless the joining 
BS is under a different MG. This will reduce handoff latency during multicast session.   
TABLE 5.5 EFFECT OF WIRELESS PER ON MULTICAST SESSION INITIALIZATION 
LATENCY( IL )  
                 (CG-SIZE = 4 BSS/MG, ln//200 hrvehi =λ , NO. OF RGM = 2). 
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Fully-trusted System Semi-Trusted System PER 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
0.0001 2.3318[2.2614,2.4021] 2.3606 2.4223[2.2558,2.6689] 2.4114 
0.001 2.3496[2.2248,2.4744] 2.3677 2.4392[2.3204,2.558] 2.4283 
0.0025 2.3896[2.2791,2.5] 2.3826 2.4623[2.4396,2.485] 2.449 
0.01 2.4316[2.1819,2.6814] 2.4435 2.5385[2.4408,3.0724] 2.5136 
0.05 2.812[2.5109,3.113] 2.8417 2.9479[2.8234,3.0724] 2.9356 
 
Table 5.5 shows the effect of wireless PER on IL for both the FT and ST systems. 
The higher the PER, the number of retransmissions required to send a message 
successfully to the receiver will increase. This increases the average message 
transmission delay in the wireless part of the network. Again, increase in message 
transmission delay cause more handoff to happen during session establishment since a 
vehicle need to wait longer under a BS before being authenticated and receive SK. Hence, 
the IL increases with higher PER as it is seen in Table 5.5. 
TABLE 5.6 EFFECT OF VEHICLE ARRIVAL RATE ON MULTICAST SESSION 
INITIALIZATION LATENCY ( IL ) 
         (CG-SIZE = 4 BSS/MG, PER = 0.0001, NO. OF RGM = 2). 
 
Fully-trusted System Semi-Trusted System 
iλ  
veh/hr/l
n 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytic
al) 
100 1.0337[0.9581,1.1094] 1.005 1.8503[1.6957,2.0049] 1.821 
200 2.3318[2.2614,2.4021] 2.3606 2.4223[2.2558,2.6689] 2.4114 
300 3.2063[3.1017,3.3109] 3.2632 3.3245[3.1529,3.4961] 3.3441 
 
The effect of iλ  on IL is presented on Table 5.6. Since iλ is independent and 
identically distributed, the total arrival rate of vehicles is ∑
=
=
NL
i
i
1
λλ  veh/hr, where NL is 
  
85  
the total number of lanes in the road. As iλ  increases, the number of vehicles under each 
BS increases which increases the message arrival rate at BS, RGM and CM. 
Consequently, message transmission delay and receiving buffer delay in both wired and 
wireless part increases. Hence, IL increases with iλ . However, since the road trajectory is 
known, there is an upper limit of the number of vehicles that could reside under a BS at a 
certain time. That makes the architecture practicable. 
TABLE 5.7 EFFECT OF NUMBER OF RGM ON MULTICAST SESSION INITIALIZATION 
LATENCY ( IL )  
                          (CG-SIZE = 4 BSS/MG, PER = 0.0001, ln//200 hrvehi =λ ). 
 
 No. of 
RGM  
Fully-trusted System Semi-Trusted System 
 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
IL [95% CI]  (Sec ) 
(Simulation) 
IL  (Sec) 
(Analytical) 
1 2.3224[2.1647,2.48] 2.3677 2.3954[2.378,2.4128] 2.4077 
2 2.3318[2.2614,2.40214] 2.3606 2.4223[2.378,2.4128] 2.4114 
4 2.3426[2.1104,2.5749] 2.3677 2.4204[2.3731,2.4676] 2.4171 
 
The Auto Company or the Software Vendor may decide on the number of 
Regional Offices in certain coverage area. From GKM perspective, when there are more 
regional offices in a certain area, the RGM-level handoff increases. The RGM-level 
handoff requires handoff notification and handoff joining messages to be forwarded to 
the corresponding RGMs. Upon receiving the handoff leaving message, the leaving RGM 
sends the vehicle authentication key to the joining RGM. The joining RGM sends the 
vehicle authentication key to the joining BS and the BS sends its public key and multicast 
session key to the vehicle in case of the FT system or the joining RGM sends its public 
key and multicast SK to the vehicle via the joining BS in case of the ST system. In 
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summary, RGM-level handoff increases the initialization latency IL in both the FT and 
ST systems. Table 5.7 shows the effect the number of RGM on IL which is simulated 
over 100 miles area. Moreover, the more Regional offices, the higher operational cost it 
would be for the AC or SV. However, if there is less number of RGMs, there is 
possibility of single-point failure.  
Table 5.8 shows the analytical result of HL  to perform each type of handoff 
during multicast session. Note that, the BS- and MG-level handoff latency for ST system 
is lower than the FT system. In the FT system, both the BS- and MG-level systems require 
the vehicle authentication key to be transferred to the joining BS, and the joining BS 
needs to send its public key to the vehicle. On the other hand, in ST system RGM does 
not need to send the vehicle authentication key and its public key since the vehicle is still 
under the same RGM. However, RGM-level handoff in ST system requires some 
additional wired messages to be transmitted which cause HL to be little higher in ST 
system than the FT system. 
TABLE 5.8 COMAPRISON OF HANDOFF LATENCY ( HL ) 
(PER = 0.0001, CG-SIZE = 4, BSS/CG, NO. OF RGM =2,  
ln//200 hrvehi =λ ). 
HL (Sec)  
(Fully-Trusted System) 
HL (Sec)  
(Semi-Trusted System) 
iλ  
veh/hr/ln 
BS-level 
Handoff 
MG-level 
Handoff 
RGM-level 
Handoff 
BS-level 
Handoff 
MG-
level 
Handoff 
RGM-level 
Handoff 
100 1.4562 1.8999 1.9001 1.3849 1.4132 1.9019 
200 2.2728 2.3648 2.3826 2.2559 2.2559 2.4524 
300 4.0179 4.2235 4.2242 3.7736 3.7736 4.3066 
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5.3.2 Storage Overhead 
In calculating the storage overhead of proposed key management protocols, we 
determine the number of keys that each entity involved in GKM needs to maintain. We 
classify the keys in three categories: pair-wise shared key, group-wise shared key and 
public/private key pair for asymmetric encryption. The arrangements of these three types 
of keys from the point of view of the entities are summarized in Table 5.9.  
TABLE 5.9 ARRANGEMENTS OF KEYS OF THE ENTITIES INVOLVED IN GKM. 
Entity Pair-wise Shared Key Group-wise Shared 
Key 
Public/Private 
Key  
Vehicle 
( mV ) 
A set of Authentication 
Keys (
m
Vk (
n
m
V
m
V kk ,,
1
L )) 
shared between mV and 
the RGM.  
Multicast session key 
(
m
Ck ) shared by the 
multicast group 
members.  
1. Public key of the 
RGM to which it 
is registered. 
2. Public key of the 
BS under which 
it is currently 
residing if the 
system is fully-
trusted. 
 
Base 
Station 
( iB ) 
1. BS authentication key 
( i
m
Bk ) shared between a 
BS imB and the RGM 
iR . 
2. BS-Leader private key 
(
mLB
k ), shared between 
the group leader 
i
Lm
B and a BS ijB  for 
FT-system. 
1. All-BS session key 
( A_BSk ) for FT-system 
which is used by the 
RGM to multicast the 
software packets to its 
underlying BSs. This 
short term key is 
shared between an 
RGM and a set of BSs 
residing under that 
RGM.  
2. Control- Group key 
( iCGmk ) shared among 
the BSs imB  in a 
control Group.  
3. Multicast session key 
1. Its own 
Public/Private 
key pair. 
2. Public key of the    
RGM under 
which it resides. 
3. Public keys of 
neighboring BSs 
under the RGM 
( iBA NP * ). 
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(
m
Ck ) if the 
infrastructure is fully-
trusted.  
RGM 
( iR ) 
1. RGM authentication 
key (
i
Rk ) shared 
between the AC and an 
RGM 
2. BSs authentication 
keys (
i
B
i
B kN * ) 
3. Authentication keys of 
vehicles registered 
under the RGM. 
(
m
V
i
VN k* ) 
1. All-BS session key 
( A_BSk ) for fully-
trusted system. 
2. Multicast session keys 
(
i
CC kN * ) if the 
infrastructure is semi-
trusted. 
1. Its own 
Public/Private 
key pair. 
2. Public key of the    
BSs reside in 
that region. 
 
 
In both the FT and ST systems, the RGM stores authentication keys of vehicles 
that are registered under its region. In the ST system, the RGM generates and distributes 
session keys of all MGs under its region. Hence, it has to store more keys compared to 
the RGM in FT-system. On the other hand, a BS in the FT-system has to store a CG key, 
multicast SK and vehicles’ authentication keys for that software update session. Hence, 
BSs in FT-system require maintaining more keys than the BSs in ST-system.  For FT-
system the vehicle needs to store the BS’s public key in addition to its authentication key, 
multicast SK and the RGM’s public key. 
5.3.3 Computational Overhead  
Various computational overhead performed by each entity during multicast 
session initialization, handoff and re-keying are shown in Table 5.10 for both the FT and 
ST systems. The notation E and D stand for encryption and decryption operations, 
PuKey is the public key operation and KeyPr is the private key operation, RHN , MHN and 
  
89  
BHN  are total number of RGM-level, MG-level and BS-level handoff, respectively. For 
FT-system, the RGM delegates most of the computations to the BSs whereas in a ST-
system the BSs act as intermediate entities to relay the messages from the RGM to the 
vehicles. Hence, they need to perform very little computation in comparison to the RGM. 
The vehicles need to perform same amount of computation for both the FT and ST 
systems.   
TABLE 5.10 COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD FOR FT AND ST SYSTEMS. 
 Entity Fully-trusted System Semi-trusted System 
RGM  ( ) ENPuKeyKeyN VRH ++Pr  ( )
( )PuKeyKeyN
DENKey
RH
V
+
+++
Pr
Pr
 
iB  
( )
)(Pr*)(
*
Pr
PubKeyKeyNN
DEN
Key
BHMH
i
VB
++
++
+
 
-- 
M
u
lt
ic
a
st
 
S
es
si
o
n
 
In
it
ia
li
za
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o
n
 
mV  DEPuKey ++  DEPuKey ++  
1B  PuKey  + KeyPr  -- 
2B  DEKeyPuKey +++ Pr  -- 
mV  DE +2  DE +2  
B
S
- 
a
n
d
 M
G
-l
ev
el
 
h
a
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d
-o
ff
 
RGM  -- DE +  
1B  E -- 
R
G
M
-
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el
 
h
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d
-o
f\
f 
2B  DE +2  -- 
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mV  DE +2  DE +2  
1RGM  KeyPuKeyD Pr++  KeyPuKeyD Pr++  
2RGM  EKeyPuKey ++ Pr  DEKeyPuKey +++ Pr  
 
5.3.4 Security Analysis 
In the proposed GKM protocols, each entity involved in software distribution 
requires mutual authentication before start any communication. Since the CM, RGM and 
BS are fixed entities, authentication is done using a standard mutual authentication 
protocol such as Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Secure Socket Layer (SSL), 
Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Shell (SSH) or authenticated Diffie-Helman 
method. We assume that each vehicle will equipped with a set of authentication keys. 
One key is used only in one session to authenticate the vehicle. The authentication key is 
shared only with the RGM and/or trusted BSs. Since the multicast SK is sent to each 
vehicle individually encrypted with its authentication key, any unauthorized vehicle 
cannot obtain the SK.  This provides authentication as well as confidentiality of the SK. 
During multicast session, any handoff message sent by the vehicle is encrypted with its 
authentication key which provides non-repudiation of the message. When an RGM or a 
BS sends authentication key of a vehicle to another RGM or BS, or sends any re-keying 
or data request message, it digitally signs the message to provide authenticity, integrity 
and non-repudiation. Moreover, each message will have timestamp that prevents replay 
attack. It is important to protect vehicles’ ECUs and memory buffers that contain 
proprietary software from both outside and inside attackers, for example, unauthorized 
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employee or ex-employee. We propose to design vehicles’ ECUs and memory buffers as 
read protected and tamper resistant devices so that no one can retrieve proprietary 
information by implementing any kind of security attack.      
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6 CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
This thesis presents detail architecture of RSU in advance vehicles’ software 
modules using existing wireless communication technologies such as Wi-Max, Wi-Fi or 
cellular. In order to upload software in a single vehicle, wireless unicasting is proposed 
where the BSs act as proxies to reliably and honestly relaying the software packets from 
the SV to the vehicle. Since they do not have access to the software packets, it eliminates 
any security threat that might exist if the BSs locally decrypt and encrypt the packets. The 
architecture provides mutual authentication of the SV and the vehicle. A vehicle’s 
authentication keys are shared between the AC and the vehicle, and different 
authentication keys are used for different software distribution sessions which prevent 
known-key attack. Through analysis and simulation it is shown that if two copies of the 
software is sent to the vehicle, the security level increases considerably. Moreover, digital 
signature of the SV ensures non-repudiation and the MD of the entire software provides 
integrity of the software. 
If the AC needs to upload software to a large number of vehicles, then wireless 
multicasting would be a better solution than multiple unicasting to individual vehicles. In 
this thesis, infrastructure based wireless multicasting is proposed where software packets 
are first routed to the BSs and then transmitted to the desired vehicles. Two GKM 
protocols based on the trust level on BSs are proposed. The RSU technique requires 
putting some level of trust on the BSs. If the BSs can be partially trusted, more secured 
system can be built. Analytical and simulation results showed that with partially trusted 
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BSs, it is possible to achieve almost similar performance as it is for fully-trusted BSs. 
The practicality of this protocol is demonstrated by simulating a VSDN which consists of 
a realistic traffic model and wireless communication model. For a BS range of 2 miles 
and a vehicle speed of 60-70 mph, a vehicle resides under a BS for about 
2
1
1 to 2 minutes. 
However, authentication and SK transport takes only few seconds. The rest of the time a 
vehicle can receive the actual software packets. The AC could use the ITS infrastructure 
or any cellular infrastructure to remotely upload software in vehicles’ electronic modules. 
This eliminates the wireless infrastructure building cost for Auto Companies. Moreover, 
software upload in vehicles’ ECUs is not a real-time process like inter-vehicle 
communication for pre-crash warning that requires high bandwidth. The software packets 
do not need to be transmitted within a short period of time and it is not a real-time 
application. Hence, the bandwidth requirement of the wireless link for uploading 
software is not a vital issue. To avoid any bandwidth limitations for the overall system, 
which includes the cellular or ITS infrastructure, software-updating process can be done 
during off-peak hours. Hence, it would not require lots of additional money; rather, if 
implemented successfully, multicasting in vehicular network can support not only the 
remote software upload, but also other numerous ITS applications such as distribution of 
weather information, optimum route information, traffic information to drivers and so on. 
In our future work, we plan to investigate the effect of various network component 
failures such as BSs or RGM. The protocol should be robust against failure to various 
network components such as BS or RGM. 
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APPENDIX A 
Introduction to DEVS  
The DEVS is a modular and hierarchical formalism for modeling and analysis of 
Discrete Event Systems (DESs) [55]. DEVS represents a complex model as a composite 
of basic models integrated hierarchically using input/output ports and couplings. The 
advantages of such modular constructions are [55]: 
1. The DEVS framework supports scalability and reusability through the use of one 
model as a basic component of another model. 
2. Each model in a model base system can be independently tested by coupling a test 
module to it. This allows verifying large complex simulation models in an 
incremental fashion.  
3. DEVS framework supports parallel and distributed simulation of models. Hence, it is 
possible to develop and deploy very large-scale complex models. 
4. It supports discrete event approximation of continuous systems. 
5. Object oriented implementation of DEVS formalism is possible.  
The DEVS formalism defines two types of models: atomic and coupled. An 
atomic model is one that cannot be decomposed further while a coupled model can be 
decomposed into component models. The atomic model defines the system behavior 
whereas the coupled model describes the system structure. Formally, an atomic DEVS 
model is defined by a 7-tuple structure: 
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,,,,
int
,,, >=< τλδδ extSYXA   
where X is a set of input events, Y is a set of output events, S is a set of states, δint is the 
internal transition function, δext  is the external transition function, λ is the output 
transition function, +∞Τ ,0:τ  is the time advance function.  
A DEVS coupled model is defined as: 
,,,,},{,,, >=< SELECTICEOCEICiMDYXN  
where D is the names of sub-component set, )}({ DiiM ∈ is the DEVS models (atomic or 
coupled) set interacting through their interface, U
Di
iXXEIC ∈
×⊆ is a set of external input 
couplings, Y
Di
iYEOC ×∈
⊆ U is a set of  external output couplings, UU
Di
iX
Di
iYIC ∈
×
∈
⊆ , 
SELECT  is the tie breaking selector. When the coupled model N receives an input event, 
the coupled DEVS transmits the input event to the sub-components through EOC. When 
the sub-component produces its output event, the coupled DEVS transmit it to the other 
sub-components through IC. It also produces output event for N through EOC. For an 
example, in VNET, many vehicles share a communication channel to send various 
messages to other vehicles or BS. Figure 7.1 (a) shows an example of  coupling relation 
between  DEVS models that consist of an atomic model W_Net (wireless channel) and a 
coupled model V1 (vehicle 1). The V1 consists of two atomic models – V1_Main which 
is the main part of a vehicle and V1_TX which performs as a transceiver. There are other 
vehicles connected to the W_Net in similar fashion. The V1_Main first sends a message 
through the output port ‘oCom’ to V1_TX, V1_TX transmits the message to the W_Net 
via its output port ‘oComV’ which is coupled with the output port ‘oComV’ of V1. The  
  
96  
W_Net forwards the message to destination through one of its output port coupled with 
the input port of the destination vehicle. Similarly, if V1 is the destination for any 
message then W_Net transmits it to V1_TX through output port ‘V1’ which is coupled 
with the input port ‘iComV’ of V1. Since input port ‘iComV’ of V1 is coupled with the 
input port ‘iComV’ of V1_TX, V1_TX receives the message and forwards it to V1_Main 
through output port ‘oCom’. Each atomic model has its own state transition diagram. 
Figure 7.1(b) represents the hierarchical DEVS construction of this system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 a) Vehicular Wireless Communication Network: An example of coupling  
relation of DEVS formalism b) Hierarchical construction of VNET. 
 
Dynamic Structure DEVS 
Many real systems have the characteristics to change their structure dynamically 
to adapt with the internal/external changes of the environment. Although DEVS is a 
popular method to simulate a variety of systems, it does not support changes in model 
structure during simulation run. The Dynamic Structure DEVS (DSDEVS) is the 
formalism to specify systems that can change their structure dynamically. The two well-
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accepted DSDEVS algorithms are Dynamic Structure Discrete Event (DSDE) system 
[58, 59] and dynDEVS [60]. The DSDE supports changes in structure by the introduction 
of a special model called network executive that stores all possible states of structural 
changes and their corresponding component sets in each structural state. Changes in 
executive state are automatically mapped into changes in structure. Alternatively, 
dynDEVS introduces two dynamic DEVS models: dynDEVS (atomic) and dynNDEVS 
(coupled) along with their corresponding model transition function, ρα (atomic) and 
(coupled). In dynDEVS, a model’s state space, internal and external transition, output, 
time advance, and model transition functions are subject to change during simulation. 
Formally, a DSDEVS is represented by 
>=< yxsSYXDSDEVS δδτ ,,,0,,, , where X and Y are input and output event set, 
respectively, ><×= CiMDselfSS },{, is the set of partial states, selfS is the set of self 
states, >< CiMD },{, is the structure information, 
U UU UUU 













 ×
∈≠∈
×
∈∈
×= Y
Di
iY
ijDj
jX
Di
iY
Di
iXXC
;
 is the set of couplings, Ss ∈
0
is the 
initial partial state, xδ and yδ are the external and internal transition functions, 
respectively. 
DEVS Simulator 
Ziegler proposed the abstract simulator concept for simulation of DEVS models 
[61, 62]. In abstract simulation algorithm, each model is associated with a virtual 
processor that interprets the dynamics specified by the formalism in a one-to-one manner. 
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Simulation proceeds by means of message passing among the processors, not among 
DEVS models. The messages carry information about internal and external events as well 
as data needed for synchronization. There are two types of processors: a simulator for an 
atomic model and a coordinator for a coupled model. A special kind of coordinator 
called root coordinator which is not associated with any model, is responsible for 
advancing the simulation time. Each processor simulates a system by sending and/or 
receiving the four types of messages - *, x, y and done. The details of how the simulation 
runs can be found in [55, 61, 62]. 
The DEVS based Simulation Model Development for VSDN 
The entities involved in the VSDN architecture are: CM, RGM, BS, Vehicle, 
Road, Net (Wired Communication Channel) and W_Net (Wireless Communication 
Channel). The DEVS architecture of this system requires 11 atomic models: CM_Main, 
RGM_Main, BS_Main, V_Main, TX, W_TX, Net, W_Net, Road, Generator and 
Transducer. The entities CM, RGM, BS and Vehicle are defined as coupled model 
consist of two or more atomic models mentioned above and Road is defined as DSDEVS. 
There is another coupled model called ‘Experimental Frame (EF)’ that consists of 
Generators and Transducer. The coupling relations of all the models are shown in Figure 
7.2. 
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Figure 7.2 Complete VNET simulation Model. b) Experimental Frame coupled with 
Network a) Structure of Network Coupled Model that consists of other 
atomic and coupled models. 
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Updating software in vehicle Electronic Control Units (ECUs) will become a 
mandatory requirement for a variety of reasons, for examples, to update/fix functionality 
of an existing system, add new functionality, remove software bugs and to cope up with 
ITS infrastructure.  Software modules of advanced vehicles can be updated using Remote 
Software Upload (RSU) technique. The RSU employs infrastructure-based wireless 
communication technique where the software supplier sends the software to the targeted 
vehicle via a roadside Base Station (BS). However, security is critically important in 
RSU to avoid any disasters due to malfunctions of the vehicle or to protect the 
proprietary algorithms from hackers, competitors or people with malicious intent. In this 
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thesis, a mechanism of secure software upload in advanced vehicles is presented which 
employs mutual authentication of the software provider and the vehicle using a pre-
shared authentication key before sending the software. The software packets are sent 
encrypted with a secret key along with the Message Digest (MD). In order to increase the 
security level, it is proposed the vehicle to receive more than one copy of the software 
along with the MD in each copy. The vehicle will install the new software only when it 
receives more than one identical copies of the software. In order to validate the 
proposition, analytical expressions of average number of packet transmissions for 
successful software update is determined.  Different cases are investigated depending on 
the vehicle’s buffer size and verification methods. The analytical and simulation results 
show that it is sufficient to send two copies of the software to the vehicle to thwart any 
security attack while uploading the software.   
The above mentioned unicast method for RSU is suitable when software needs to 
be uploaded to a single vehicle.  Since multicasting is the most efficient method of group 
communication, updating software in an ECU of a large number of vehicles could benefit 
from it.  However, like the unicast RSU, the security requirements of multicast 
communication, i.e., authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of the software transmitted 
and access control of the group members is challenging. In this thesis, an infrastructure-
based mobile multicasting for RSU in vehicle ECUs is proposed where an ECU receives 
the software from a remote software distribution center using the road side BSs as 
gateways. The Vehicular Software Distribution Network (VSDN) is divided into small 
regions administered by a Regional Group Manager (RGM). Two multicast Group Key 
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Management (GKM) techniques are proposed based on the degree of trust on the BSs 
named Fully-trusted (FT) and Semi-trusted (ST) systems. Analytical models are 
developed to find the multicast session establishment latency and handover latency for 
these two protocols. The average latency to perform mutual authentication of the 
software vendor and a vehicle, and to send the multicast session key by the software 
provider during multicast session initialization, and the handoff latency during multicast 
session is calculated. Analytical and simulation results show that the link establishment 
latency per vehicle of our proposed schemes is in the range of few seconds and the ST 
system requires few ms higher time than the FT system. The handoff latency is also in the 
range of few seconds and in some cases ST system requires less handoff time than the FT 
system. Thus, it is possible to build an efficient GKM protocol without putting too much 
trust on the BSs. 
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